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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Following a period of sluggish growth, the Euro Area is showing signs of 
recovery and this is reflected in the GDP growth forecasts for 2006 and 2007. 
Growth in the final quarter of 2005 was weak at only 0.3 per cent, but we are 
forecasting a recovery to a stronger rate of 0.7 per cent in the first quarter of 
2006. We expect this performance to be maintained through 2006 and so we 
forecast GDP growth of 2.2 per cent for this year. For 2007, we forecast a 
slightly slower rate of GDP growth, 2 per cent. The forecast also includes an 
expectation of continued strong growth in the world economy. 
 
Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
     
Output Growth 1.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.0
Inflation Rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
Unemployment rate 8.3 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.1 7.8
Govt. Balance as % 
of GDP 
-2.6 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2
 * Inflation rate is the HICP measure and unemployment is the EUROSTAT standardised rate 
 
A number of positive factors underpin this forecast. Investment is forecast to 
provide the largest proportionate increase in the components of demand. In 
2006, investment growth of 4 per cent is expected, substantially higher than the 
2.1 per cent figure for 2005. Much of the improvement can be traced to 
Germany where business sentiment appears to be strong, thereby prompting 
an expectation of increased investment. The strong investment performance is 
expected to persist into 2007 with a growth rate of 3.5 per cent forecast.  
 
Consumption and government spending are also forecast to contribute to the 
improved growth performance. Growth in consumption is forecast to rise 
from 1.4 per cent in 2005 to 1.6 per cent in 2006 and to rise again to 1.8 per 
cent in 2007. The contribution of net exports to overall growth will be 
somewhat muted. Although export volumes are forecast to accelerate due to 
growth in the global economy, so too are import volumes, partly in response to 
the growth in consumption 
 
In spite of the pick-up in growth, inflation is forecast to remain at a rate similar 
to recent years – 2.2 per cent for each of 2006 and 2007, on a HICP basis. 
With regard to the labour market, the improved growth performance in 2006 
and 2007 is expected to be reflected in a reduction in unemployment in both of 
these years. Starting from a rate of 8.5 per cent in 2005, the unemployment rate 
is forecast to fall to 8.1 per cent in 2006 and then to 7.8 per cent in 2007.  
 
The context in which the forecast is set includes the following features. The 
World economy is expected to continue growing strongly in 2006 and 2007, 
with growth rates of 4.7 per cent and 4.4 per cent forecast. All the major 
economies will contribute to this performance. For example, the United States 
is forecast to grow by 3 per cent in both 2006 and 2007, Japan is forecast to 
grow by 2.7 per cent in 2006 and 2.1 per cent 2007 while the corresponding 
figures for China are 9.2 per cent and 8.2 per cent.  
Other features of the overall context include an easing in oil prices and relative 
stability in the euro dollar exchange rate. 
 
Additional elements of the analysis within the report include the following 
results:  
• Between 2000 and 2006 the Chinese current account surplus increased by 
4 per cent of GDP, and we might expect this to have reduced world real 
interest rates by up to 0.4 percentage points.   
 
• Although investment has been weak in many economies of the Euro Area, 
the degree of weakness is not exceptional given prevailing economic 
conditions. 
 
• The likelihood of recent oil price increases feeding through into wage 
demands is higher in the US than Europe, based on analyses of equations 
in which wages are partly determined by expected inflation. This 
difference helps to explain forecasts of higher inflation in the US relative 
to Europe and, within Europe, higher inflation in Italy. 
 
With regard to the interest rate environment, we expect that the ECB will 
continue to raise key rates in the near future. There are several reasons why the 
ECB will tighten policy somewhat. One is that inflation has remained above 
the target for a long time, albeit moderately, and in the recent survey reported 
by the ECB inflation forecasts were raised slightly compared to the previous 
one. Also, the monetary overhang, which the ECB interprets as one leading 
indicator for future inflation, increased further due to persistently high money 
growth. And finally, following weak growth in the last quarter of 2005, the 
Euro Area economy has picked up in the first quarter of 2006 thereby making 
some further increases in interest rates likely. 
 
We expect that the government deficit targets announced in the Stability 
Programmes will be met at the Euro Area level in 2006, with the aggregate 
deficit amounting to 2.4 per cent of GDP. Among the countries running 
deficits of at least 3 per cent of GDP in 2005, we expect the deficit targets in 
the Stability Programmes to be met in Germany and France this year and next 
year. This will not be the case however for Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
Although the aggregate Euro Area government deficit will fall to 2.2 per cent 
of GDP in 2007, this is above the figure of 1.9 per cent contained in the 
Stability Programmes. 
 
The fiscal reforms that are proposed for Germany in 2007 may have significant 
economic effects so it is important to estimate the size of these impacts. Our 
analysis suggests that GDP will be 0.1 per cent lower in Germany in 2007 as a 
result of the reforms, with similar impacts in 2008 and 2009. The reforms will 
have a small but positive impact on GDP in 2006 (0.2 per cent) as a result of 
bringing forward of consumption in expectation of the VAT increase.  
 
In discussing the Lisbon Strategy, we pose the following question: why has the 
Lisbon Agenda only limited success? One reason may be the institutional 
setting. The high priority that is given to fiscal and monetary stabilisation 
policies is reflected in the existence of sanctions if the members of the Euro 
Area do not meet the Maastricht criteria. In contrast, the low priority given to 
the Lisbon strategy can be seen in the absence of institutions to enforce the 
achievement of targets. 
 
The “special topic” of this EUROFRAME – European Forecasting Network 
report considers some of the consequences of the Euro Area enlargement on 
both the entrants to EMU and the monetary union as a whole. The following 
elements are included: 
 
• A summary of how membership in a monetary union affects the 
participating countries.  
 
• A review of the main challenges for the new member states, in 
particular their potential additional adjustment needs arising from the 
process of catch up growth.  
 
• An investigation of the functioning of alternative adjustment 
mechanisms, such as the labour market, real wage flexibility and fiscal 
policy.  
 
• Analyses of issues related to the preparation process are addressed, 
plus the implications for the functioning of the enlarged Euro Area. 
 
Based on the analysis, a number of conclusions emerge. The new member 
states stand to gain substantially from the adoption of the euro. The lower 
interest rate in the Euro Area will promote catch up growth, while financial 
stability will be enhanced due to the elimination of exchange rate risk to the 
euro. Being a member of the Euro Area will make the financing of the large 
current account deficits easier and less costly. Furthermore it will eliminate the 
risk of a currency crisis following sharp reversals of capital flows. 
  
Nevertheless, maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability during the 
growth process will remain a challenging task. A smooth process of catch up 
growth depends critically on higher growth and income being realised in a 
sustainable way, i.e. that the debt and credits can be serviced without major 
demand adjustment. The lower interest rate is likely to be beneficial for 
investment, but at the same time may challenge the capacity of the financial 
system to choose and monitor the most efficient investment projects. Financial 
supervision is all the more important given that foreign owned banks dominate 
the financial markets of the new member states and it may not be sufficiently 
clearly defined who regulates and supervises these banks.  
 
Because of the small size of the new member states, the enlargement will affect 
the Euro Area’s growth and inflation rates only to a limited extent. Both rates 
will nevertheless rise slightly without affecting the dynamics. Whereas the 
higher growth rate may not have any impact on the functioning of the Euro 
Area, the higher trend inflation rate might affect monetary policy. Of course, 
the impact will in all likelihood remain small, however the definition of price 
stability may have to be considered and marginally adjusted. European 
enlargement also makes it more crucial to rethink economic policy in Europe. 
If monetary policy cannot react to specific cases, it is necessary to reconsider 
the fiscal policy framework including the a priori set public finance targets. This 
might reduce the risk that not all countries benefit from the common monetary 
policy in the same way. 
1. OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA 
Following general sluggishness in the Euro Area growth performance in 
recent years, 2006 is forecast to bring about an improved performance with a 
GDP growth rate of 2.2 per cent. This is the fastest rate of expansion since the 
year 2000. The composition in growth is also expected to differ from recent 
years. In particular, domestic demand is now expected to contribute relatively 
more strongly to the growth performance in 2006, with both consumption and 
investment posting gains. Stronger growth should continue into 2007, although 
at a slightly slower pace of 2 per cent. 
1.1 
Overview 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
Output Growth Rate  1.9 1.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.0 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 
2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Unemployment Rate  7.8 8.3 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.1 7.8 
Govt. balance as % of GDP  -1.9 -2.6 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 
        
 
The context in which our forecast is set includes the following features. The 
World economy is expected to continue growing strongly in 2006 and 2007, 
with growth rates of 4.7 per cent and 4.4 per cent forecast respectively. All the 
major economies will contribute to this performance. The United States, 
although slowing, is forecast to grow by a still respectable 3 per cent in both 
2006 and 2007, Japan is forecast to grow by 2.7 per cent in 2006 and 2.1 per 
cent in 2007 while the corresponding figures for China are 9.2 per cent and 8.2 
per cent respectively. Additional features of the overall context include a slight 
easing in oil prices, a gradual increase in Euro Area interest rates and relative 
stability in the euro-dollar exchange rate. 
 
As regards the two largest economies of the Euro Area, our forecast includes 
the following: GDP growth in Germany is expected to rise to 2.3 per cent in 
2006 before falling back to 1.5 per cent in 2007; for France, the corresponding 
figures are 2.2 per cent and 2 per cent; for Germany, the slowdown in 2007 is 
to some extent related to proposed fiscal reforms that will be introduced in 
2007, which are explored in depth below. 
 
1.2 
Global Outlook 1.2.1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
Table 1.2 reports EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth in major 
regions in autumn of 2005 and spring of 2006. The outcome for world growth 
in 2005 was stronger than we anticipated six months ago. This reflects stronger 
1 
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growth both within the OECD (in the US, the Euro Area and especially 
Japan), as well as outside the OECD (especially in China). The upward revision 
to Chinese growth reflects an historical revision of the national accounts data, 
which raises growth in China by an average of 0.5 percentage points per 
annum between 1993 and 2004. Partly due to the high growth in 2005, we have 
also revised our projection for world growth in 2006 up by 0.4 percentage 
points since our October forecast. While the outlook for North America is 
slightly weaker than expected in our previous forecast, this is more than offset 
by stronger growth in the Euro Area and Asia.  
Table 1.2: GDP Growth Forecasts in Autumn 2005 and Spring 2006 
 
 World OECD NAFTA Euro Area 
 Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring 
2005 4.2 4.6 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.4 1.2 1.4 
2006 4.3 4.7 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.0 1.8 2.2 
2007 4.3 4.4 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.0 2.0 
 
Below we discuss some of the key developments in commodity and financial 
markets underlying our current forecast.  
OIL PRICES 
Oil prices rebounded in the first quarter of this year with Brent crude reaching 
over 60 dollars per barrel, following a temporary dip to around 55 dollars per 
barrel in November last year1, as geopolitical issues in Iran and Nigeria, 
coupled with cold weather in Russia and cyclones in Australia, curbed crude 
supply. Nonetheless, compared to the extremely tight market condition in the 
immediate aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita during September 2005, 
current oil market conditions are somewhat more subdued. Our current 
projections for the oil price are therefore slightly lower than that in our 
previous forecast in October last year, as seen in Figure 1.2.1. 
 
Figure 1.2.1. Oil Price in the Euro Area 
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Dubai prices, to remain above 55 dollars per barrel over our forecast horizon 
through 2007. As in 2005, the oil price is expected to be supported over the 
next 2 years by rapid growth and industrialisation in large emerging economies, 
 
1 The dip occurred due to the coordinated release of government controlled emergency 
inventories by IEA member countries. 
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particularly in Asia whose growing share in world output is also raising the oil 
demand of the world economy as a whole. Furthermore, a thin margin of spare 
oil production capacity is expected to continue into 2007 despite new supplies 
from both non-OPEC and OPEC countries, as existing production comes 
close to its short-term capacity while some existing fields, e.g. the North Sea, 
suffer from declining yields. Rising crude oil stocks, which are close to five-
year highs, will do little to dampen the oil price given the lack of spare capacity 
in oil production. Capacity utilisation in global refining has reached its highest 
level in three decades. This limited capacity coupled with continued 
geopolitical instability in major oil producing regions will likely lead to volatile 
price movements in the next two years. 
 
The impact of a rise in oil prices differs significantly across countries, and 
igure 1.2.2. Impact of a $10 rise in oil price on output and inflation 
n a global level, the increased purchasing power of oil exporting economies 
his improvement in the stock of net foreign assets raises the financial wealth 
                                                
depends upon factors such as the oil (and gas) intensity of output, the speed of 
reaction of the wage-price system, the role of expectations2, the response of 
the monetary authorities, the export exposure to oil producing markets and the 
speed at which oil revenues are recycled back into the global trading system. In 
terms of inflation, the negative effects of higher oil prices tend to be felt less 
acutely in the Euro Area than the US as the Euro Area is a less energy 
intensive economy. Figure 1.2.2 shows the impact of a $10 rise in oil prices on 
the level of output and inflation in the Euro Area and US. 
 
F
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
%
 p
oi
nt
 d
iff
er
en
ce
0.6
Output US Output Euro Area Inflation US Inflation Euro Area
 
O
in response to an oil price rise should largely offset the loss in purchasing 
power of oil importing countries, assuming these revenues are recycled 
relatively quickly. The initial impact of a rise in oil prices on oil exporters is an 
improvement in the current account balance, as the price of exports rises 
relative to the price of imports. OPEC’s current account balance as a per cent 
of GDP improves initially by 1.1 percentage points, while net foreign assets as 
a percentage of GDP rise by 6 percentage points after ten years.  
 
T
of oil exporting economies, and this in turn raises domestic demand. Rising 
domestic demand pushes import growth up, and this supports export growth 
in the economies that export to OPEC and other oil exporting nations. We 
have found structural differences in import behaviour amongst oil exporters 
before and after 1990, reflecting the slower build up of imports that we saw in 
 
2 The links between inflation, wages and expectations are analysed in section 1.4.1. 
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the 1970s and 1980s before infrastructure improved in the oil exporting 
countries in response to higher revenues. In the current episode of oil price 
increases, oil revenues have thus far been recycled relatively rapidly, as they 
were in the early 1990s. Import volume growth has outstripped export volume 
growth in OPEC, Russia and Canada since 2003. We expect import volumes to 
continue to rise, and in our simulations money is recycled relatively rapidly. As 
the Euro Area conducts a relatively large share of trade with the oil exporting 
countries, this leads to a rise in Euro Area world trade share of over ½ 
percentage point after 5 years. 
 
Figure 1.2.3. The rise on Euro Area world trade share, per cent gain in world   
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underway in the US. The Federal Open Market Committee has raised the 
target for the Federal Funds rate by ¼ point at each of its meetings since June 
2004, to reach 4.5 per cent in January 2006. This reflects a cumulative rise of 
350 basis points. The ECB has also raised rates by 50 basis points since our 
last forecast, having held the interest rate on the main refinancing operations in 
the Euro Area stable at 2 per cent since June 2003. We have seen a similar rise 
in Swedish rates, while rates in the UK remain unchanged following cuts 
introduced last summer. The quantitative easing measures have been lifted by 
the Bank of Japan and rates are expected to rise gradually over the next two 
years. The key interest rate assumptions underlying our forecast projections are 
reported in Appendix Table 5. Our interest rate projections are somewhat 
higher than we expected 6 months ago. Figure 1.2.4 plots our current 
projections against projections underlying our October 2005 forecast. We see 
rates roughly ½ percentage point higher in the US and the Euro Area by the 
end of 2006 relative to our last forecast. This reflects a stronger outlook for the 
Euro Area and rising inflation expectations in the US.  
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Figure 1.2.4: 3-Month Money Market Rates 
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Figure 1.2.5: 10-year Government Bond Yields 
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L
1.2.5 illustrates the revision to long-term interest rate projections underlying 
our current forecast. They have risen by about 0.2 percentage points in the US 
and the Euro Area since October, but remain largely unchanged in the UK. 
The rise in short-rates relative to long-rates has introduced a flat and even 
temporarily negative yield curve in the US, and the implications of this are 
discussed in Box 1.1 below. There exist a number of tentative explanations for 
the current low long-term interest rates, and we discussed some of these issues 
in our last report. In Box 1.2 we focus on the role that a rapidly expanding 
China may play in low global interest rates. 
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Box 1.1: Does the Flat Yield Curve Suggest a Recession is Coming in the 
US?  
The yield spread – the difference between the long-term and the short-term interest 
rate – is widely discussed as a leading indicator for economic activity. While the yield 
spread does not affect economic activity in itself, in contrast to the level of short-term 
or long-term interest rates, it may contain information about market expectations of 
future changes in inflation and real interest rates, which may in turn be associated with 
fluctuations in real output.3 Historically, for the United States, there has been a reliable 
relationship insofar as a flat or negative yield spread has consistently been followed by 
a recession or at least a significant slowdown in real GDP growth (Figure A).4 Against 
this background, developments in the bond markets seem to signal that the US 
economy will start to slow during the next one or two years.5 
 
Figure A: Interest rates, the yield spread and recession periods in the United States 
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 Despite the drop in the yield spread, EUROFRAME-EFN projects US economic 
growth to stay high. The main reason why we think the current situation differs from 
past experience is the exceptionally low level of long-term interest rates associated with 
the current term-structure. Long rates have not reacted to the rise in the short-term 
interest rate, and the yield curve has flattened at a level of short-term interest rates that 
are generally regarded as neutral, or even slightly expansionary, whereas in previous 
episodes of yield curve inversion monetary policy was tight. For the current low long-
term interest rates numerous explanations have been advanced including: high demand 
from pension funds in Europe; regulatory changes for insurance companies in Europe 
and the US, which favour the investment in bonds over investment in other assets to 
achieve a better matching of the durations of assets and liabilities; demand from Asian 
central banks recycling capital inflows to prevent appreciation of the home currency, 
                                                 
3 Arthuro Estrella, The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator: Frequently Asked Questions, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, October 2005. 
4 For an empirical assessment see A. Estrella, A.P. Rodrigues, and S. Schich (2003). How stable 
is the predictive power of the yield curve? Evidence from Germany and the United States. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 85(3), 629-644. 
5 The yield curve is a significant predictor for US economic activity not only 4 quarters ahead 
but also 8 and even 12 quarters ahead . 
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which temporarily was responsible for a huge share of demand for US long-term 
government bonds; and excess liquidity in the international financial system caused by 
the strong monetary expansion during the period of very low interest rates following 
the burst of the IT-bubble, which has reduced risk premia in various asset markets.  
 While quantitative analysis based on the yield curve suggests that there is a substantial 
chance of the US slipping into recession in the near future,6 professional forecasters, 
who should take into account a broader set of information, are much more optimistic 
about the US economy.  
EXCHANGE RATES 
The euro nominal effective exchange rate rose sharply in 2002 and 2003, and 
now stands roughly 22 per cent higher than in early 2002. The strong exchange 
rate has adversely affected competitiveness and has been an important factor 
behind weak export growth in several Euro Area economies. However, it also 
reduces the cost of commodities, such as oil and manufacturing equipment, 
which are priced in US dollars, easing costs to manufacturers, and has helped 
keep under control the inflationary pressures that were emerging in the Euro 
Area until 2002. 
 
While the euro remains strong, we have seen a modest depreciation since 
October, and the exchange rate assumptions embedded into our forecast see 
the euro about 2½ per cent weaker than anticipated in our last Report. Figure 
1.2.6 shows our October exchange rate projections compared to our current 
projections. Clearly the most significant shift has been in the Japanese yen, 
which is roughly 6 per cent weaker than anticipated in October. This will 
support the re-inflation of Japanese prices and raise the contribution of the 
external sector to growth in Japan.  
 
Figure 1.2.6: Effective exchange rates 
2005Q1 2005Q3 2006Q1 2006Q3 2007Q1 2007Q3
90
95
100
105
20
05
Q
1=
10
0
US - October
UK - October
Japan - October
Euro Area - October
US - new
UK - new
Japan - new
Euro Area - new
 
 
                                                 
6 In its monthly bulletin from February 2006 the ECB presents recession probabilities for the 
US economy based on a quarterly probit model, in which the likelihood of a recession is 
explained by the preceding four values of the term spread. According to the analysis this 
probability increases sharply during 2006.   
  
 
8 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
EQUITY PRICES 
Equity prices have risen in all the major economies over the last six months. 
Figures 1.2.7 and 1.2.8 compare our October projections to our current 
assumptions for equity prices. While we have seen a rise of about 10 per cent 
in the US and the UK, share prices have risen dramatically in Japan, by more 
than 35 per cent. 
 
Figure 1.2.7: Equity Prices in US, UK and Japan 
igure 1.2.8:  Equity Prices in Germany, France and Italy 
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Share prices have also risen in the Euro Area. They are
c
France, Italy and the Netherlands. A rise in equity prices raises the financial 
wealth holdings of consumers, and therefore has a direct impact on consumer 
spending. They may also affect investment, although the evidence of a direct 
impact on investment in the Euro Area is limited. The feed through of equity 
price rises to output is relatively gradual, and the magnitude of the impact is 
modest.  Al-Eyd et al (2006)7 estimate that a unilateral 20 per cent rise in share 
prices in Germany would raise German output by 0.1 per cent after 2 years. 
 
7 Al-Eyd, A., Barrell, R. and Holland, D. (2006), ‘The role of financial markets’ openness in the 
transmission of shocks in Europe’, presented at FINPROP Policy Conference, Brussels, 
February. 
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The impact of a global shock is more significant, and if all global share prices 
rise 20 per cent we would expect to see German growth rise by about 0.3 
percentage points for two years, reflecting mainly the impact of stronger 
growth in the US on exports from Germany.   
1.2.2 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
In 2005, world economic growth remain
global output at 4.6 per cent. The Euro Area re
ed strong with the growth rate of 
mained the weak spot in the 
orth America slowed down in 2005 from the rapid pace 
ever real GDP still rose by 3.4 per cent, slightly more than 
 
mporary. It was mainly due to sluggish private consumption which was 
growth in the US to 
oderate over the forecasting horizon. The main reason is that the outlook for 
prices are slowing. We expect the necessary correction in US house prices to 
be gradual, effected through slower nominal house price inflation for several 
world economy in an environment of robust expansion elsewhere. This picture 
is going to change slightly going forward with US growth decelerating from 3.5 
per cent to 3 per cent and the Chinese economy losing some of its momentum, 
while Euro Area growth is going to accelerate at around 2.2 per cent in 2006. 
Total world output growth is projected to increase slightly this year to 4.7 per 
cent before slowing to 4.4 per cent in 2007. 
North America 
Output growth in N
seen in 2004. How
the average over the past 10 years, in spite of significant headwinds from 
higher energy prices and the negative impact of two major Hurricanes. We 
expect growth in North America to slowdown further to around 3 per cent 
this year and next, mainly driven by reduced momentum in the United States. 
 
The marked slowdown in US growth in the fourth quarter proved to be
te
depressed by a temporary loss in purchasing power due to higher prices for gas 
and oil products and the sharp reduction of special incentives to buy 
automobiles by the major car manufacturers. Both effects have diminished 
towards the end of the year and into 2006, with energy costs having fallen 
significantly from the peaks seen in September and October and car sales 
having recovered to healthy levels. In addition unseasonably warm weather 
over much of the winter has supported activity and indicators point to a strong 
rebound of the US economy in the first quarter of 2006.  
 
Despite the relatively strong start to the year, we expect 
m
private consumption, the main driver of economic growth over the past years, 
has clouded. Over recent years, consumption has almost consistently outpaced 
disposable income growth, and the personal savings rate declined to negative 
values in the course of last year. With employment growth and real wage 
increases having been modest in comparison to previous upswings, a major 
source of strength in personal consumption has been low interest rates and 
wealth effects from rising house prices. Both of these factors are expected to 
fade over the forecast horizon. With long-term interest rates having bottomed 
and expected to gradually increase over the coming quarters, the potential for 
releasing purchasing power through mortgage refinancing activities is greatly 
reduced. House prices have seen a sustained upswing for 10 years now and 
house price inflation has accelerated to levels last seen in the late 1970s. 
According to estimates in the literature any overvaluation in the housing 
market was generally found to be modest around 2004. However, given 
developments in real disposable income, housing stock supply and real interest 
rates, the most recent upsurge in prices appears to have resulted in an 
overvaluation of at least 10 per cent. There are already indications that house 
years, rather than a sharp drop in nominal house prices. Nevertheless, housing 
wealth should increase at a much slower pace this year and next, which will 
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bring the growth in real private consumption down to slightly less than 3 per 
cent from 3.6 per cent last year, despite a notable acceleration in real 
disposable income stemming from robust employment growth and slightly 
higher increases in average earnings.  
 
Figure 1.2.9: Annual House Price Growth in the United States 
 
-10
-5
0
5
19
76
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
03
20
04
20
05
an
nu
al
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
ha
ng
15
20
e
10e 
c
 
Business investment is supported by high capacity utilization, high profitability 
and strong balance sheets and should continue to expand swiftly, although we 
expect some moderation from the fast pace seen last year as a result of higher 
interest rates and a less bullish outlook for private consumption. Slower 
domestic demand growth will be reflected in slower import growth, but 
nominal real
exports are also expected to slowdown reflecting the appreciation of the US-
again rose at an 
sed rate of more than 5 per cent, raising output 4 per cent above the 
ne year before. The upturn is mainly driven by strong investment 
dollar in the second half of last year. Real GDP is forecast to rise by 3 per cent 
in both 2006 and 2007. Consumer price inflation increased last year to 3.4 per 
cent driven by the strong rise in energy prices. We project inflation to 
moderate only gradually as, given the high rate of capacity utilization in the 
economy, we expect some of the rise in the oil price to feed through into 
wages. The current account deficit is projected to remain above 6 per cent of 
GDP; an abrupt devaluation of the dollar, which would be part of a current 
account adjustment scenario, is not assumed in the baseline forecast. It 
continues, however, to be a major risk to our forecast.  
Asia 
Economic growth in Asia has gathered strength in the course of last year with 
the major economies Japan, South Korea and China all benefiting from a 
domestically driven upturn. Most notably, the expansion in Japan proved to be 
much stronger than expected. Real GDP in the fourth quarter 
annuali
level o
growth and increasingly also by private consumption which is benefiting from 
rising employment and higher real wage growth. Exports remained brisk, with 
exports to China and other Asian economies continuing to rise rapidly and 
exports to the US picking up in the course of the year reflecting the 
devaluation of the yen vis-à-vis the dollar. Rapid growth in China continued in 
the second half of 2005 despite a notable deceleration in export growth from 
42 per cent in nominal terms at the start of the year to 18 per cent in 
December. Real GDP in the fourth quarter was again up by almost 10 per cent 
from the same quarter in the previous year. Accelerating imports in China 
helped growth to recover in the other Asian economies from the weakness 
experienced in the second half of 2004 and in early 2005. But domestic 
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demand also strengthened in most countries on the back of accommodative 
monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
The outlook for Asia remains favourable. In Japan, the growth momentum in 
domestic demand is expected to remain intact, although some moderation is 
expected for 2006 and 2007. The Bank of Japan has reacted to the improved 
outlook for growth and the apparent reduction in deflation at the level of 
nsumer prices and has abandoned its so-called quantitative easing measures. 
s have 
rgely lagged inflation to keep real interest rates low in order to promote 
co
While this will lead to a contraction of the monetary base, the impact on the 
real economy will be minimal as interest rates in the money market will still be 
kept at close to zero for some time to come. The Bank of Japan has also said it 
will continue to buy large amounts of government bonds, a move which has so 
far been successful and is intended to prevent an adverse reaction in the bond 
markets. We expect that short-term interest rates will start rising in the second 
half of this year, but only very gradually. Consequently, monetary policy in 
Japan is expected to remain accommodative this year and also next. Real GDP 
is projected to rise by 2.7 per cent this year and by 2.1 per cent in 2007.  
 
The improved growth prospect in Japan, coupled with the more flexible 
exchange rate regimes adopted by Asian central banks, could help Asian newly 
industrialised economies to break away from the export led economic model. 
With monetary conditions remaining loose in the region, as central bank
la
private consumption and investment, we expect the recovery in domestic 
demand to be sustained. In China, the move in the exchange rate regime from 
a dollar peg to a managed floating regime based on a currency basket which 
was implemented last summer has led to only modest changes in the value of 
the renmimbi. The revaluation against the dollar to date amounts to only 4.5 
per cent. With export growth currently having lost momentum, we do not 
expect the government to tolerate a further significant appreciation of the 
renmimbi for the time being.  The strong rise of investment has continued and 
the potential build-up of overcapacity is increasingly a concern not only in the 
field of property development. The government is reacting by targeting the 
allocation of credit away from these sectors. On the other hand, the 
government has highlighted the promotion of domestic demand as one of the 
most important policy objectives in the recent 11th five-year plan. To this end it 
has announced increased expenditures for social security and rural 
development as well as a further expansion in investment in infrastructure. We 
expect growth of the Chinese economy to slow modestly to some 9 per cent in 
2006 and slightly more than 8 per cent in 2007. 
 
Box 1.2: The impacts of the growth of China on world inflation and 
interest rates 
The remarkable growth of the Chinese economy over the last two decades or so led 
many observers around 2000 to ask whether it had contributed to lower global 
inflation by increasing the supply of manufactured goods. Subsequently the strength of 
demand in China has led to some upward pressure in oil and other commodity prices, 
but overall it is still widely believed that Chinese competition has been a restraining 
factor in price inflation. We can gauge the growth of the economy by looking at its 
share of world trade and its current account surplus. Imports have risen less rapidly 
than exports, and hence the current account surplus has grown. This pattern both 
increases the net supply of goods to the world economy and increases the scale of 
saving. Over the last 2 years we have seen slower import growth than we might have 
expected, in part as a result of the depreciation of the dollar linked renminbi, and as a 
result inflationary pressures began to emerge in China at the start of 2005. The gap 
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between imports and exports is now larger than in the past, and it may adjust as the 
economy grows and the impact of the recent appreciation is felt. 
 
Figure B: Chinese Trade and Current Account Balance 
 
Source NIESR database 
 
Figure C: Impact on China of an increase in Chinese Exports (0.8% extra 
growth) 
We can analyse the impacts of this increase by shocking our model of China by 
increasing its growth, driven by an increase in exports. We raise Chinese export growth 
by around 0.8 per cent a year from 2000. This raises Chinese growth by a quarter of a 
per cent a year and increases the current account surplus by 1 per cent of GDP by 
2007. As the rise in Chinese output is supply driven there is little impact on the output 
gap or on inflation. Imports would tend to rise with output. The impact on the rest of 
the world of the increase in exports depends on the monetary policy regime in place, 
but as long as Central Banks react relatively quickly to offset lower inflationary 
pressures and cut interest rates, then inflation will only be marginally reduced. If 
Central Banks are not fully aware of the increase in world supply then for a period 
inflation might be below target, but we can reasonably assume that they have now 
recognised the impact of China on the world economy.  
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Central Banks can control the nominal rate of interest, and hopefully the inflation rate. 
In the medium term they have no role in determining the real interest rate, which is the 
outcome of the balance between saving and investment in the World economy. The 
increase in Chinese saving will put downward pressure on real interest rates 
everywhere, and by 2007 real long term rates would be 0.1 percentage points lower 
than they would have been for every 1 per cent of Chinese GDP increase in the 
current account surplus. Between 2000 and 2006 the Chinese current account surplus 
increased by 4 per cent of GDP, and we might expect this to have reduced world real 
interest rates by up to 0.4 percentage points.   
Figure D: Impact of faster Chinese growth on OECD long real rate 
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Non Euro Area European Economies 
Growth in European countries outside the Euro Area has generally exceeded 
expectations from last autumn. Upside surprises have been pronounced in the 
cases of Denmark and Sweden, where real GDP growth came in around one 
half of a percentage point higher than expected. A similar upside is evident for 
the new member states where real GDP growth for 2005 is now estimated to 
have amounted to 4.6 per cent, compared to a forecast of 4.1 per cent made in 
the previous report.  On the other hand, growth in the United Kingdom was 
slightly disappointing at 1.8 per cent.  
 
The sharp slowdown in GDP growth in the United Kingdom from 3.2 per 
cent in 2004 was led by a deceleration in growth in consumer spending, 
compounded by a softening in growth in private sector investment volumes. 
Consumer spending was restrained by moderate growth in household real 
disposable incomes, in part a result of the rise in the tax burden on incomes 
over the past two years and the pick up in inflation in 2005. At the same time, 
the housing market slowed significantly and with it the rate of increase in 
housing wealth, one of the supports of buoyant consumer expenditure in 
recent years. The slowdown in the housing market may also help to explain 
weak housing investment last year, although housing investment in the United 
Kingdom is best described as volatile and often appears unrelated to 
developments in house prices. Business investment has turned out weaker than 
anticipated, but it is difficult to describe current investment activity as 
exceptionally weak, as discussed in section 1.4.1. The outlook shows real GDP 
growth in the United Kingdom picking up this year and next, supported by a 
small pick up in consumer spending and more robust investment and export 
demand. Inflation is expected to remain close to target, contained in part by 
strong labour force growth, following the expansion of the European Union in 
2004, and rising unemployment. Wages are also likely to be restrained by the 
need for firms to make stronger productivity gains following exceptionally 
weak productivity growth last year.  
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The Scandinavian economies Denmark and Sweden recorded strong growth in 
2005 of 3.4 and 2.8 per cent, respectively, fuelled by buoyant private 
consumption and a marked acceleration in private investment. We expect 
growth in both countries to remain robust, with the rate of increase in GDP in 
2006 accelerating further in Sweden and diminishing somewhat in Denmark 
where the upturn seems to be maturing. Unemployment is expected to come 
down further, reaching levels of 4 per cent in Denmark and 4.7 per cent in 
Sweden, respectively, in 2007 on a standardised basis indicating that there will 
be little slack in these economies by the end of the forecast horizon. 
Consequently, we expect underlying consumer price inflation to pick up 
somewhat this year and next.   
 
In 2005 GDP growth in New Member States (NMS) continued to grow rapidly 
(4.6 per cent), though slightly less dynamically than in 2004 when a set of one-
off effects, mostly related to EU accession, took place.8 In most countries 
strong investment and export dynamics led the growth in 2005. The biggest 
economy among the NMS, Poland, recorded the lowest growth rate as a 
consequence of the slow down in consumption and stockbuilding, although it 
should be noted that growth accelerated during the year. Robust growth was 
recorded in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (preliminary estimates of 6.0 per 
cent for both), in the first case driven by positive net exports and – in the 
second case – by investment and private consumption. Baltic countries saw 
further acceleration in economic growth to 7-10 per cent, on the back of 
strong domestic demand. 
 
We expect the rate of growth in NMS during 2006 and 2007 to be maintained 
(4.7 per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively). EU funds will provide a stable 
element in investment demand though it is based on the expectation that the 
majority of assigned funds of the 2004-6 EU budget will be utilised. Poland 
will see some acceleration in domestic demand on the back of a resumption in 
household consumption (along with an improvement in labour market 
conditions and wage dynamics) and some improvement in investment. Due to 
faster growth in imports, net export will make less of a positive contribution to 
growth. We expect GDP growth in Slovakia (due to less robust investment 
demand) and Czech Republic (due to some worsening of foreign trade position 
only partially offset by stronger domestic demand) to slow down a little in 
coming years. We also expect growth in Hungary to be around 4 per cent with 
stable consumption growth supported by the VAT reduction, but some 
deceleration in investment.  
  
Inflation in NMS has been low in recent months, on average registering levels 
below those in the Euro Area since June 2005. Three countries, i.e., Latvia, 
Estonia and Slovakia stand out with inflation above 4 per cent due to the 
combination of administered and foodstuffs’ price hikes. The outlook for 2006 
looks very favorable with an average inflation at 2 per cent. Such a low level in 
the regional inflation is partly the result of currency-appreciation-driven 
deflation in non-energy industrial goods and very low inflation in foodstuffs in 
the biggest NMS. Inflation is projected to rise somewhat in 2007 to 2.5 per 
cent, or just above the Euro Area rate. The planned Euro Area entry by 
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia in 2007 may be a challenge only for Estonia, 
where in 2006 the expected HICP is just above the average for three lowest 
indexes in the European Union. 
The Russian economy is still benefiting strongly from the high commodity 
prices. The rate of growth is, however, gradually diminishing, from 7.2 per cent 
                                                 
8 See Chapter 3 of this report for an extensive discussion on NMS and entry to the Euro Area. 
  
   OUTLOOK FOR THE EURO AREA 15 
 
in 2004 to 6.4 per cent in 2005 and around 6 per cent in 2007, according to our 
forecast, as production is hampered by bottlenecks in infrastructure and 
increasing import penetration as a result of the relentless appreciation of the 
rouble. The real effective exchange rate has risen beyond the level that 
prevailed before the Russian crisis in 1998. However, with commodity prices 
firm, monetary policy effectively stimulative and fiscal policy expected to be 
loosened, we expect domestic demand to remain robust over the forecast 
horizon. Inflation is projected to remain relatively high. Strong monetary 
growth and a continuous rapid increase in wages is putting upward pressure on 
consumer prices. In addition, the reduction of inflation in the second half of 
last year was due to administrative price controls and did not reflect a 
moderation of underlying inflationary pressures. Therefore, there is a 
substantial upward risk to our scenario of a gradual decline in the rate of 
inflation.  
 
We will begin this section by providing an overview of our forecasts for the 
Euro Area before looking at the three largest Euro Area countries and also 
focus on Finland explaining the reasons behind specific GDP growth patterns 
for 2005 and 2006. As part of the country-specific discussions, we will present 
an analysis of the potential impacts of the fiscal reforms that are planned for 
Germany in 2007. Also in this section, we provide details of the economic 
programmes being offered by the two coalitions facing each other in the Italian 
election. 
1.3 Euro Area 
detail 
EURO AREA FORECASTS 
Following a period of sluggish growth, the Euro Area is showing signs of 
recovery and this is reflected in the GDP growth forecasts for 2006 and 2007. 
Growth in the final quarter of 2005 was weak at only 0.3 per cent, but we are 
forecasting a recovery to a stronger rate of 0.7 per cent in the first quarter of 
2006. The EUROFRAME indicator released for the FTD also suggests rapid 
growth in the Euro Area in the first half of the year, as does the GDP indicator 
released by the European Commission. We expect this performance to be 
largely maintained through 2006 and so we forecast GDP growth of 2.2 per 
cent for this year. This is an upward revision to our previous forecast for 2006 
of 1.8 per cent. For 2007, we forecast a slightly slower rate of GDP growth, 2 
per cent. This is the same as the forecast contained in our autumn 2005 report. 
The overall forecast for the Euro Area is strongly influenced by the forecast 
for Germany. The improvement in the Euro Area growth performance 
between 2005 and 2006 is mainly due to our forecast of an increase in the rate 
of growth in Germany. From a rate of 1.1 per cent in 2005, growth in 
Germany is forecast to rise to 2.3 per cent in 2006. However, growth in 
Germany is forecast to fall back somewhat in 2007, to 1.5 per cent. This largely 
explains our forecast of a slower rate of growth in the Euro Area in 2007 
relative to 2006. The reason for the German slowdown in 2007 is elaborated 
upon below (see section 1.3.3 below) but here we can simply note that the 
proposed fiscal package in Germany in 2007 has some negative impact on 
growth. 
 
A number of positive factors underpin this forecast. Investment is forecast to 
provide the largest proportionate increase in the components of demand. In 
2006, investment growth of 4 per cent is expected. This is substantially higher 
than the 2.1 per cent figure for 2005 and the 2.8 per cent figure contained in 
our autumn forecasts. Much of the improvement can be traced back to 
Germany where business sentiment appears to be strong, thereby prompting 
an expectation of increased investment. The improved investment 
performance is expected to persist into 2007 with a growth rate of 3.5 per cent 
forecast. A further discussion of investment is provided in section 1.4.1. 
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Table 1.3.1  Euro Area Forecasta 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Consumption 1.9 0.9 1 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Private investment -1.9 -3.1 0.6 2.1 2.1 4 3.5 
Government expenditure 2.3 2.4 1.7 0.9 1.5 2.3 1.6 
Stockbuilding(b) -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Total domestic demand 0.8 0.3 1.3 1.9 1.6 2.3 1.9 
Export volumes 3.6 1.7 1.2 5.9 3.9 6.6 5.4 
Import volumes 1.8 0.4 3 6.2 4.7 6.8 5.3 
GDP 1.9 1 0.7 1.8 1.4 2.2 2 
Average earnings 3.7 3.5 2.8 2.2 2 2.3 3.3 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Private consumption deflator 2.5 2 2 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 
Real personal disposable income 2.5 1.6 1 1.6 0.6 1 1.8 
Standardised Unemployment, % 7.8 8.3 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.1 7.8 
Govt. balance as % of GDP -1.9 -2.6 -3 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 
Govt. debt as % of GDP 69.3 69.2 70.4 70.8 71.6 70.5 69.2 
Current account as % of GDP -0.3 0.8 0.5 0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 
a  GDP data shown in table are adjusted for working-day variation. 
b change as a per cent of GDP. 
 
Consumption and government spending are also forecast to contribute to the 
improved growth performance. Growth in consumption is forecast to rise 
from 1.4 per cent in 2005 to 1.6 per cent in 2006 and to rise again to 1.8 per 
cent in 2007. The contribution of net exports to overall growth will be 
somewhat muted. Although export volumes are forecast to accelerate due to 
growth in the global economy, so too are import volumes partly in response to 
the growth in consumption. The deficit on the current account is forecast to 
grow from 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 0.7 per cent in 2006, before easing 
again to 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2007. 
 
In spite of the pick-up in growth, inflation is forecast to remain at a rate similar 
to recent years – 2.2 per cent for each of 2006 and 2007, on a HICP basis. This 
stability in the rate of inflation partly reflects the existence of spare capacity in 
the Euro Area economy. It also reflects the apparent non-emergence of second 
round effects from recent oil price increases. A third factor is the stability in 
inflation expectations that act to anchor actual inflation. While the German 
VAT increase in 2007 will work to increase inflation, this will be 
counterbalanced by other factors such as an easing in oil prices thereby leading 
to the stable rate. (In section 1.4.2 below, we provide a fuller discussion of 
inflation, expectations and wages.) 
 
With regard to the labour market, the improved growth performance in 2006 
and 2007 is forecast to be reflected in a reduction in unemployment in both of 
these years. Starting from a rate of 8.5 per cent in 2005, the unemployment rate 
is forecast to fall to 8.1 per cent in 2006 and then to 7.8 per cent in 2007. The 
unemployment rate falls can be explained mainly by economic growth. 
 
Although the improved growth performance in 2006 is not reflected in the 
government balance, an improvement is forecast for 2007. For 2006, the 
government deficit is forecast to remain at its 2005 level of 2.4 per cent of 
GDP. However, this is forecast to be 2.2 per cent in 2007. The stability in the 
figure between 2005 and 2006 hides the fact that the deficits in both France 
and Germany are forecast to fall below 3 per cent in 2006. These 
improvements are partly offset by a further deterioration in the Italian 
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government deficit which is forecast to rise from 4.1 per cent in 2005 to 4.8 
per cent in 2006. 
 
The forecast is based on the following assumptions:  
The oil price is projected to average nearly $59 per barrel in 2006, but will 
recede to average $56 per barrel in 2007. 
The exchange rate between the US$ and the euro is expected to average $1.21 
in 2006 and $1.22 in 2007. 
The short-term interest rate in the Euro Area is projected to be 2.9 at the end 
of 2006 and 3.3 at the end of 2007. 
The forecasts are based on data available up to 10th March 2006. 
The assumptions for commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates used 
in the forecast were constructed by consensus, as the average projections of 
the 10 member Institutes. These are broadly consistent with current financial 
market expectations and forward markets, as the majority of Institutes use this 
information in constructing their own forecasts. 
GERMANY  
Following a temporary slowdown in the fourth quarter of 2005, the German 
economy has regained momentum at the beginning of 2006. Leading indicators 
point to a rather strong rebound in the first quarter of the year. Manufacturing 
orders improved markedly in the second half of last year with foreign orders 
having been particularly strong. Survey data not only confirm a favourable 
business climate in manufacturing but increasingly suggest that the situation 
has improved in most other areas of the German economy. Most notably, 
indicators such as retail sales suggest that the long-lasting weakness in private 
consumption might have come to an end. 
  
The outlook for 2006 is favourable. The upturn will continue and real GDP 
should rise by 2.3 per cent (on a working day adjusted basis),9 the highest rate 
of growth recorded since 2000. Unlike previous years, the expansion will not 
be driven mainly by foreign demand, although there will again be a sizeable 
positive contribution to growth from net exports. Investment growth is 
projected to accelerate to 4 per cent, up from an almost flat reading in 2005, as 
firms have been successful in repairing their balance sheets and restoring 
profitability. In addition, the multi-year recession in the construction sector is 
coming to an end. Private consumption is also likely to pick up after the 
prolonged stagnation in the years 2002–2005, and should grow by around 1 
per cent on the back of rising employment and improved consumer 
confidence.  
 
In 2007, real GDP growth is projected to slow down to 1.5 per cent. One 
factor behind slower growth is the implementation of a fiscal package 
consisting of a rise in the regular VAT rate by 3 percentage points and a cut in 
social security contributions by a net of 1.4 percentage points. This will raise 
consumer price inflation and dampen growth (see Box 1.3 for an evaluation of 
the package). In addition, less momentum in world trade reflecting somewhat 
slower growth outside the Euro Area is also expected to dampen the rise in 
production, as is the gradual increase in interest rates. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
9 There is a negative impact from less working days than in the previous year both in 2006 and 
2007. This will reduce the unadjusted annual figure, which is reported by the German federal 
statistical office, by 0.2 per cent in each year compared to the adjusted figures which are 
employed in this report. 
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positive effects on investment of new tax rules for depreciation introduced in 
2006 will fade. Finally, there is a small positive impact on growth in 2006 from 
hosting the soccer world cup, mainly from a temporary boost to tourism. CPI 
inflation is forecast to rise to 2.3 per cent in 2007 from 1.6 per cent in 2006. 
The unemployment rate should continue to decline to 8.3 per cent, following a 
substantial drop from 9.5 to 8.6 per cent in 2006. As discussions about the 
prospects for 2007 are generally dominated by the potential impact of 
proposed fiscal reforms in Germany it is useful to analyse these in some depth. 
Box 1.3 An Evaluation of German Fiscal Package 
Looking first at the details of the proposed measures, the German government plans 
to consolidate its budget by raising indirect taxes and reducing taxes on labour. The 
standard rate of VAT, which covers around 60 per cent of the VAT base, will be raised 
by 3 percentage points raising around €24.4 billion a year. The German statistical office 
has calculated that a rise in the regular VAT rate alone would raise consumer prices by 
0.45 per cent arithmetically, i.e. with full pass through and no adjustments whatsoever. 
The package also includes a rise of the insurance tax by 3 percentage points, raising 
perhaps some €1.5 billion, and increasing the price level by perhaps 0.1 per cent. As a 
partial offset there is a lowering of the unemployment insurance contribution rate by 2 
percentage points at a cost €14.5 billion. On the other hand there will be an increase in 
the contribution rate to public pensions by 0.4 percentage points (€3 billion) and to 
public health insurance by probably 0.2 percentage points (€2 billion). The budget 
balance is expected to improve by 0.4 per cent of nominal GDP in 2007 taking into 
account other measures. 
It is useful to evaluate this package using NiGEM. In NiGEM, the increase in the 
regular VAT rate by 3 percentage points translates into a rise in the total indirect tax 
rate by just under 1 percentage point. The net reduction of social security contribution 
by 1.4 percentage points translates into a reduction of all direct (employer’s and 
employee’s) taxes on personal income by around 0.5 percentage points. The effects of 
the package depend, inter alia, on the role of expectations in the wage bargain, the 
reactions of the ECB to the rise in inflation and the speed with which a cut in 
employers’ tax feeds into wages. In addition, a pre-announced increase in indirect taxes 
may induce consumers to bring forward consumption as the real rate of interest falls 
for one quarter by 4 percentage points. We assume in our simulations that wage 
bargainers are aware of the package and that this feeds into the short run dynamics of 
wages.A Employers’ taxes are a substitute for direct taxes, and in the long run we 
assume the incidence of the tax does not matter, and will not affect wages. However, 
in the short runB employers will receive a benefit which reduces their costs and helps 
reduce the potential second round effects of the rise in indirect taxes. In addition it 
raises their profits, and hence their payouts to shareholders, helping support 
consumption. 
We have simulated this package under a variety of assumptions. Our core results have 
no pre-emptive ECB reaction to the first round effects, and interest rates stay on our 
baseline until the second quarter of 2007. Wage bargainers are assumed to be forward 
looking, as are financial markets, and margins between producer and consumer prices 
are not assumed to absorb any of the price increase. We have also assumed that just 
over 1 per cent of a quarter’s consumption is brought forward from 2007 into 2006. 
This latter presumption is based on the impacts of the pre-announced switches from 
direct to indirect tax in the UK in 1979 and recent German experience, where the 
evidence of potential impacts is mixed. A 1 percentage point rise in the basic rate of 
VAT in 1993 was associated with a rise in consumption of 3.5 per cent in the fourth 
quarter of 2002 and a fall of 2.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2003. However, a 
similar rise in April 1998 led to no apparent switching of consumption between 
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quarters.  In the UK direct taxes rose by 3 percentage points when the standard rate of 
VAT was raised from 8 to 17.5 percentage points, and around 4 per cent of 
consumption was brought forward by one quarter. The impacts of these switches on 
GDP were much smaller as they were absorbed into stock building and imports, and 
we expect this to be repeated. 
In our full package, consumer prices rise by under 1 per cent in 2007, with limited 
second round effects, as we can see from the chart. Output rises marginally in 2006 
and is lower than it would otherwise have been by 0.1 percentage points in 2007.C The 
ECB raises rates in the second quarter of 2007 to help offset any second round effects 
of the increase in prices. Government borrowing declines by 0.4 per cent of GDP, and 
in the medium term the budget returns to our baseline with higher indirect and lower 
direct taxes. If the ECB were to react in 2006 in anticipation of the temporary rise in 
inflation in 2007, short-term interest rates would increase by 0.2 percentage points in 
2006. This pre-emptive move would have little effect on inflation because it is 
temporary and hence exchange rates would not react. If there were no offsetting 
effects on employers’ taxes then the impact on inflation would rise to around one 
percentage point, and the budget would improve by 0.6 per cent of GDP.  
 
A In the long run real wages are determined by the growth of productivity and the level of 
equilibrium unemployment, but in the short run they may depart from this.  Our equations are 
discussed in Barrell R., and Dury, K. (2003) ‘Asymmetric labour markets in a converging 
Europe: Do differences matter?’ National Institute Economic Review No. 183, January 2003. 
B We assume a half-life of 3 years for the decay process, with all cuts in employers taxes 
eventually being passed on into wages. 
C Other models employed (such as the one developed at the Kiel Institute, for example) estimate 
slightly higher negative effects on output. The relatively small effect in NiGEM may be related 
to the forward looking expectations implemented in the model, that lead to wages following 
prices more quickly and, consequently, less reduction purchasing power of households in the 
short term.  In the current environment of relatively low bargaining power of unions in 
Germany, which are currently more concerned with preventing increased working hours and 
institutional reforms rather than increasing nominal wages, behaviour of wages might differ 
from the one in the model.  Al Eyd, A., Barrell, R., (2005) ‘Estimating Tax and Benefit 
Multipliers in Europe’ Economic Modelling vol 22 pp 759-776investigate tax and benefit multipliers 
in NiGEM. They suggest that a balanced budget switch from direct to indirect taxes would raise 
output marginally as income would initially decline less when there is a rise in indirect taxes as 
compared to direct taxes rise, as some of the rise is absorbed into higher nominal wages. 
 
  
Figure 1.3.1: Impacts of the German Tax Package 
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FRANCE  
As with Germany, French GDP growth has been unexpectedly weak in the last 
quarter of 2005 as compared with signals given by survey data. GDP grew by a 
mere 0.2 per cent, driven down by weak industrial production, notably in the 
automobile industry. OFCE’s quarterly GDP growth indicator based on survey 
data suggested, meanwhile, GDP growth at around 0.7 per cent in the last 
quarter of the year. This discrepancy between hard data and survey data is to 
say the least somewhat of a puzzle and leads us to be cautious on the profile 
for GDP growth at the turn of the year. Industrial production rose by 0.3 per 
cent in January on a monthly basis and survey data suggest robust growth at 
the beginning of the year. Hence OFCE’s indicator suggests GDP growth of 
around 1 per cent both in the first and second quarters of 2006 based on 
survey data available at the end of February. This leads us to expect rapid GDP 
growth in the first half of 2006.  
 
We expect French GDP growth to accelerate at 2.2 per cent this year and 2 per 
cent next year following a disappointing 1.4 per cent in 2005. A number of 
factors will stop dampening growth. The impact of the past rise in oil prices 
and in the euro real exchange rate have largely been felt, while the forecast 
acceleration of German GDP growth will have a positive impact on French 
exports. However, French exporters have been losing market share in the last 
few years and although some stabilisation may occur with the help of more 
favourable exchange rate developments, French exports will not be the main 
engine for growth. Net external trade’s contribution to growth will remain 
slightly negative.  
 
We expect a slightly negative fiscal impulse under current budget plans. Fiscal 
contraction will come from low public spending growth, while households will 
benefit from tax cuts in 2007. The deficit target announced in the SP would be 
met in 2007 at around 2.7 per cent of GDP, down from 3 per cent in 2005 and 
2.8 per cent in 2006. However, as 2007 will be an electoral year, fiscal policy 
could be less restrictive than currently announced, which would leave the 
government deficit closer to 3 per cent of GDP.  
 
Under the combined effects of output growth and employment policies, the 
unemployment rate will keep on decreasing, down from 9.5 per cent in 2005 to 
8.7 per cent in 2007 in terms of the standardised unemployment rate. 
ITALY 
In 2005 Italian GDP was flat on average as well as during the last quarter of 
the year (Euroframe-EFN estimate, as the release of quarterly data has been 
postponed). Despite another year of disappointing growth, we expect the 
Italian economy to recover in 2006. We expect growth to expand over the first 
half of this year as companies start to rebuild inventories and export and 
investment weakness is coming to an end. Household consumption seems still 
subdued, as only demand for durable goods remains on a rising trend. 
 
The external environment remains favourable, and the recovery in the Euro 
area - especially in Germany, the most important market for Italian exports - 
should sustain Italian economy in 2006 and 2007, when GDP is expected to 
grow by 1.0 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively. A bright outlook, if 
compared to the past four years when GDP grew by only 0.4 per cent on 
average, a more gloomy outlook if compared with other Euro area countries, 
where growth will reach the 2.1 per cent over this two years.  
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The gap is explained by the difficulties that part of the Italian industrial sector 
is facing due to the lack of competitiveness and the increase of competition in 
the international markets that Italian exports have been suffering from (see 
EUROFRAME-EFN report, Autumn 2005). A huge restructuring process of 
industrial production is under way and it is likely to last for some time to come.   
This structural crisis is one of the main problems any new government will 
have to face. In Italy a general election will be held on April 9-10. Two 
coalitions of parties are facing each other: the incumbent centre-right (or 
House of Liberties) and the centre-left (or The Union). As usual, political 
programmes provide a long list of general goals but few specific actions to be 
implemented in order to achieve the goals. As a consequence, we will focus on 
the announced measures, which are very general and, to a degree, shared by 
the two coalitions. Both election platforms contain elements aimed at 
increasing the rate of growth of Italian economy on the one hand and 
measures to support household disposable income on the other (see Box 1.4). 
Neither of the two coalitions proposes a sharp reduction in the tax burden or a 
huge redesign of the structure of public revenues and expenditures. Hence, the 
only proposal implemented in this EUROFRAME-EFN forecast is the 
reduction of the social security contributions by 1 percentage point a year as 
this seems the only explicit measure shared by the two coalitions. In addition, 
to regain a medium term consolidation path of the public finances will be 
unavoidable and so the fiscal stance will be restrictive in the next years. 
Box 1.4 Italian Election Platforms 
 
The centre-right coalition is promising, among other things, several tax reductions: 
exemption from taxation of profits reinvested in ICT and R&D; reduction in the tax 
wedge on labour by up to 3 percentage points; fulfilment of tax reform consisting in 
the introduction of only two tax-brackets (23 and 33 per cent) for taxes on personal 
income and the gradual reduction of IRAP, the regional tax on business; reduction of 
VAT on tourism activities, as in France; exemption from taxation of overtime 
earnings. Measures to support households are primarily targeted at families with 
children, such as introduction of splitting of taxable income on the number of persons 
in the household and a newborn baby bonus, but also a huge (+45 per cent) increase in 
minimum pensions. 
The centre-left agenda includes lowering the tax wedge on labour income by 5 
percentage points; re-introduction of the tax credit for additional permanent workers; 
fiscal incentives for firms expanding; tax incentives in order to raise investment in ICT 
and R&D; increasing competition/deregulation in the service sectors. Measures to 
support households are mainly targeted at young families (higher allowances, more 
public nurseries, a new Child fund, increase in low-price housing) and building a new 
long-term care system. 
The announced agendas are not so explicitly stated to permit a reliable evaluation of 
their impact. In addition, the full set of the measures is so wide that the winning 
coalition will have to choose among them. The fiscal budget constraints will not be 
consistent with the full implementation of the two programmes. Moreover, in both 
coalitions’ platforms it remains unclear how the significant fiscal cost of the measures 
is going to be financed. While the government has indicated that it will embark on a 
strategy of aggressive privatisation of state owned assets that amount to 120 per cent 
of GDP, the platform of the centre left alliance includes measures to raise tax 
compliance after five years of tax amnesties, higher and more uniform taxation on the 
return to financial assets and an explicit commitment to the Stability and Growth Pact. 
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FINLAND 
 
The Finnish economy is in good shape when compared to that of the Euro 
Area on average. Growth is strong and most structural balances, save 
unemployment, are rather sound. However, there are pressing problems such 
as ageing, which requires building up sizable current public sector surpluses to 
counter future expenditure pressures. However, shorter-term problems have 
also emerged. For example, the long labour dispute (strike and lockout) in the 
paper industry in May and June 2005 had a large impact on the annual growth 
figures of many economic variables. 
 
Box 1.5 Unrest in the Finnish economy 
Paper and pulp production was heavily depressed by the labour dispute, which led to 
mill shutdowns during part of May and the entire month of June. The industry’s 
output fell by 57 per cent in May, in year-on-year terms, plunged by just over 71 per 
cent in June, and even declined by 11 per cent in July as mills were cautious in 
restarting their paper machines following the extended production stoppage. Output 
continued to decline slightly even in August, September and October from levels seen 
a year earlier. The volume of paper and pulp industry exports contracted by almost 19 
per cent in January-August in year-on-year terms. Export prices rose by half of a per 
cent, implying a decline in export value of slightly more than 18 per cent. There were 
also additional negative effects on the wood industry, transportation and energy 
production. 
As a consequence of the labour dispute, the volume of paper industry exports 
contracted by 13 per cent in 2005 and will expand in 2006 by 21 per cent due to base 
effects caused by the strike and lockout. Export growth should then slow to around 
2.5 per cent in 2007. Output in the paper and pulp industry declined last year by over 
11 per cent, but should increase by almost 18 per cent this year in response to base 
effects. Output growth is forecast to moderate to slightly less than 4 per cent in 2007. 
If the strike had not occurred, paper and pulp production would have risen by around 
2 per cent in 2005 and about 2.5 per cent in 2006. 
ETLA estimates that the labour dispute reduced Finnish GDP growth by around one 
percentage point in 2005. As a consequence of assumed normal production in the 
industry in 2006, our forecast for GDP growth of 3.8 per cent in 2006 includes a 
percentage point of extra growth.   
 
Investment and inflation are two issues which have recently been subject to 
much discussion. In the case of investment, the low rates of expansion in the 
Euro Area economies have prompted concerns that the rates are below what 
would have been expected given prevailing economic conditions. In the case 
of inflation, the recent increase in the price of oil has led to concern about 
second round effects in the labour market. Given the importance of these 
issues, we explore each in greater detail in the following sections. 
1.4 Additional 
topics 
1.4.1 INVESTMENT IN EUROPE – HAS IT BEEN WEAK? 
 
Output growth has been relatively weak over the last five years, and domestic 
demand growth since 2003 has hardly been any higher than GDP growth. 
Demand growth can be weak because output growth is weak and borrowing 
costs are high, or because individuals decide to either save more or invest less 
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than they would have done given output and borrowing costs. Weakness in 
investment that is unexplained by developments in the economy can be a 
worry for the longer term, as it would mean that the capacity to produce in the 
future would be constrained. The EUROFRAME group has expert knowledge 
of many European economies and in an annex to this report we survey views 
on investment behaviour in the major economies.10 All Institutes maintain 
models of their economies and comments are based on them.  
 
It is difficult to model investment, as adjustment to changes in the equilibrium 
capital stock can take varying amounts of time depending on essentially 
subjective decisions about the prospects. Hence all the equations we discuss 
have large errors on them, and all Institutes accept that there is a degree of 
uncertainty in their projections. Most Institutes derive their investment 
equations from a production function, and have labour and capital demand 
curves. In some cases these are estimated together, as in the work from Kiel, 
whilst in other, such as that from NIESR, DIW and Prometeia, they are 
estimated essentially separately but with theoretical constraints. In each of 
these cases we can look at the residuals on our estimated equations to judge 
whether investment has been weak in the last few years, and residuals for 
business investment or investment in equipment are plotted for the UK, Italy 
and Germany in the annex to the report.11 In only one case, the Kiel equation 
for Germany (see Figure 1.3.2), do the residuals look relatively weak in the last 
two years, and even then they remain within historical bounds. Investment 
projections in the Netherlands and Finland are made using more disaggregated 
models, but in both cases a chart of the projections against outturn from the 
models used suggest that investment has not been particularly weak in the last 
three years. However, it is generally agreed that some support to investment 
has been made by special projects by governments, especially in smaller 
countries. We conclude that the sources of weak output growth in the Euro 
Area have to be found elsewhere and that these sources may be cyclical or 
structural. 
 
Figure 1.3.2: Residuals on Business Fixed Investment Equation for Germany 
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10 The annex can be found at www.euroframe.org.  Contributions were received from Christian 
Dreger at DIW and Carsten-Patick Meier at Kiel from Germany, Rebecca Riley at NIESR for 
the UK, Stefania Tomasini at Prometeia for Italy, Henk Krankendonk from the CPB for the 
Netherlands and Paavo Suni at ETLA for Finland. Other Institutes provided comments, and 
Ray Barrell from NIESR drafted the note.  
11 C.f. footnote 11. 
  
 
24 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
1.4.2 EXPECTATIONS AND INFLATION 
 
We have seen a steady rise in the oil price since mid-2003, with a cumulative 
rise of 135 per cent over this period. Strengthening exchange rates have offset 
about 10 per cent of the rise in the Euro Area, Japan and Canada, while a 
weaker US dollar has compounded the impact in the US. An oil price rise of 
this magnitude must inevitably have some global inflationary impact. Inflation 
expectations, as captured by inflation-indexed bonds, have edged up in the US 
and the Euro Area, as illustrated in Figure 1.4.1 US inflation expectations are 
about 0.8 percentage points higher than at the start of 2003, while Euro Area 
inflation expectations have risen by just 0.2 percentage points.  
 
Figure 1.4.1: Inflation Expectations 
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The inflation expectations illustrated here reflect average annual inflation over 
a 10-year forward horizon. Yields on 5-year bonds in the US point to a rise of 
closer to 1.25 percentage points per annum in inflation expectations over the 
next five years. Clearly there has been some upward drift in inflation 
expectations since the oil price began to rise, but the rise has been relatively 
modest in the Euro Area. This suggests that inflation expectations over a 10-
year horizon are relatively well anchored, with consumers expecting monetary 
authorities to keep inflation in check.  
 
Inflation expectations play a key role in our forecasts for wage growth. We 
utilise model-based expectations that embed some degree of credibility in the 
inflation target, but allow for some drift in prices. If wage bargainers expect the 
Central Bank to be more strict in its response to inflation than our model-
based rules suggest outcomes may be different from those suggested by the 
model. Real wage growth has shown some moderation in major economies, 
and real wages have actually fallen in Germany over this period. If wages are 
growing less rapidly than forecast, this suggests that second-round inflationary 
effects from the rise in the oil price will be weaker than anticipated. A simple 
dynamic model for wages can be expressed as: 
 [ ] επαπααλα +−+++−−+=∆ −−−− eUprodpwagewage )ln()1()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( 33121111
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In the long run, wages move in line with producer prices at factor cost (p) and 
trend productivity (prod). In the short-term, wages adjust to clear the labour 
market, where U is the unemployment rate, and move with a weighted average 
of current consumer inflation (π) and expected consumer inflation (πe). We 
assume expected inflation embodies rational expectations that look forward 
one period. These weights (α 3) are estimated for each country and reflect the 
extent to which wage bargaining has exhibited forward-looking behaviour in 
the past. Any unexplained movement in wages is captured in the error term 
(ε ).  
 
Figure 1.4.2 illustrates the residuals on a set of wage equations for the G7 
economies that were estimated in the format above. Clearly, since 2003, when 
the oil price began to rise, in most countries the residual has been more 
negative than in the previous three-year period.  
 
Figure 1.4.2: Average residual on wage equations 
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This decline is most pronounced in Germany, but is also evident in France, the 
UK, Canada and Japan. The relationship is less clear for the US and Italy, 
although the average US residual for 2003-2005 is smaller than in 2000-2002. 
These developments might lead us to conclude that second-round inflation 
effects are likely to be stronger in the US than elsewhere, and within Europe 
are likely to be stronger in Italy than the other large economies. This is 
consistent with our global inflation projections reported in Appendix table 3, 
where inflation in the US is expected to exceed 3 per cent both this year and 
next, and inflation is Italy is expected to outpace both Germany and France 
this year and next if we ignore the impact of the rise in VAT on German 
inflation in 2007.  
 
The observed fall in the wage residual could be driven by a number of factors. 
Inflation expectations may be lower than our model allows, with consumers 
consistently under-predicting actual inflation. Wage bargaining behaviour may 
be more forward looking than it has been in the recent past, or the bargaining 
power of employers may have increased. This could reflect rising globalisation, 
as a number of firms have managed to keep wages in check by threatening to 
move production to lower cost regions. The equilibrium unemployment rate 
may have come down, due to labour market reforms. The shift could also be 
explained by a rise in the profit share of income at the expense of the labour 
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share. This could happen in response to a rise in capital augmenting technical 
progress, for example.  
 
Any or all of these factors may be contributing to the unexpectedly weak wage 
growth in the major economies. In any case, it suggests that pass through of 
the oil price to inflation will be weaker than suggested by the model 
simulations reported in our October 2005 Report, and we identified the 
relative weakness of inflationary pressures in the Euro Area in our last Report. 
In order to analyse the effect of lower inflation expectations on wages and 
headline inflation, we undertake a model simulation with NiGEM. We reduce 
inflation expectations endogenously by 0.5 percentage points a year for three 
years in all the Euro Area countries. The size of the shock was calibrated so 
that it is just enough to ‘soak up’ the negative residual on our Euro Area wage 
equations for 2003-2005. Lower expectations feed into the wage bargain, and 
hence into costs, and as a result of this factor alone inflation would be around 
0.1 percentage points a year lower than it would otherwise have been. In 
addition, output would be marginally stronger, as we can see from Figure 1.4.3. 
The impact of the shock is strongest in Germany, and this is consistent with 
the pattern of residuals illustrated in Figure 1.4.2. 
 
Figure 1.4.3: Impact of 0.5 percentage point lower inflation expectations in 
Euro Area 
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FORECAST TABLES 
 
 
 
  Annex Table 1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Areaa 
        
 
 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Output Growth Rate 1.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.0 
Inflation Rate 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Unemployment Rate 8.3 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.1 7.8 
Gov. Balance as % GDP -2.6 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
 
Annex Table 2: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 World OECD NAFTA China 
EU-
25 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1995-
2001 
3.6 2.9 3.4 8.9 2.7 2.6 3.4 1.0 1.9 2.6 2.0 3.0 
2002 3.0 1.6 1.7 9.1 1.2 1 1.6 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.4 2 
2003 4.0 2.0 2.6 10 1.2 0.7 2.7 1.8 -0.2 0.9 0.4 2.5 
2004 5.1 3.3 4.1 10.1 2.2 1.8 4.2 2.3 1.1 2.1 1.0 3.2 
2005 4.6 2.8 3.4 9.9 1.6 1.4 3.5 2.7 1.1 1.4 0.0 1.8 
2006 4.7 3 3.0 9.2 2.4 2.2 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 1.0 2.4 
2007 4.4 2.7 3.1 8.2 2.3 2.0 3.0 2.1 1.5 2.0 1.4 2.7 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 3: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 OECD NAFTA China EU 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1995-
2001 2.3 2.7 4.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 -0.2 1.0 1.2 3.2 2.4 
2002 1.5 1.8 -0.8 1.9 2.0 1.4 -1.4 1.2 1.0 3.1 1.5 
2003 1.7 2.1 1.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 -1 1.5 1.1 2.5 2.0 
2004 2 2.7 3.9 1.8 1.9 2.6 -0.7 1.4 1.5 2.2 1.3 
2005 2.1 2.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.8 -0.8 1.3 1.2 2 2.1 
2006 2.5 3.3 2.9 2.2 2.2 3.1 0.1 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.2 
2007 2.6 3.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 3.2 0.2 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.2 
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Annex Table 4:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 World trade volume 
World export prices 
in $ 
Oil price ($ 
per barrel)a 
 Annual percentage changes 
1995-2001 7.4 -1.6 19.3 
2002 3.4 0.6 24.4 
2003 4.9 9.2 27.8 
2004 8.1 8.1 35.9 
2005 6.6 3.9 51.8 
2006 6.9 -0.9 58.9 
2007 6.0 2.5 56.0 
a Based on the unweighted average of the Brent, WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil 
prices. 
 
 
Annex Table 5: Interest Rates 
 
 Short-term interest rates  Long-term interest rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2002 1.7 0.1 3.3 4.0 4.6 1.2 4.9 4.9 
2003 1.2 0.0 2.3 3.7 4.0 1.1 4.2 4.5 
2004 1.6 0.0 2.1 4.6 4.3 1.5 4.1 4.9 
2005 3.5 0.0 2.2 4.7 4.3 1.3 3.4 4.4 
2006 4.8 0.1 2.7 4.5 4.6 1.6 3.6 4.2 
2007 5.0 0.6 3.1 4.5 4.7 1.8 3.9 4.3 
        
2005Q1 2.8 0.0 2.1 4.9 4.3 1.3 3.7 4.7 
2005Q2 3.2 0.0 2.1 4.8 4.2 1.1 3.4 4.4 
2005Q3 3.7 0.0 2.1 4.6 4.2 1.4 3.3 4.3 
2005Q4 4.3 0.0 2.3 4.6 4.5 1.5 3.4 4.3 
        
2006Q1 4.6 0.1 2.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 3.5 4.1 
2006Q2 4.8 0.1 2.6 4.5 4.6 1.5 3.6 4.2 
2006Q3 5.0 0.2 2.8 4.5 4.7 1.6 3.7 4.2 
2006Q4 5.0 0.3 2.9 4.5 4.7 1.7 3.8 4.2 
        
2007Q1 5.0 0.4 3 4.5 4.7 1.8 3.8 4.2 
2007Q2 5.0 0.6 3.1 4.5 4.8 1.8 3.9 4.2 
2007Q3 5.0 0.7 3.2 4.5 4.8 1.8 4.0 4.3 
2007Q4 4.9 0.9 3.3 4.5 4.8 1.8 4.0 4.3 
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Annex Table 6: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2002 3.0 -0.5 7.4 2.9 3.3 4.8 2.5 
2003 -6.0 3.9 13.7 6.6 6.4 7.1 -2.7 
2004 -4.7 4.2 5.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 5.3 
2005 -2.7 -3.1 -1.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 
2006 -0.5 -4.7 -2.3 -1.1 -0.9 -1.3 -1.7 
2007 -0.7 3.4 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 -1.0 
2005Q1 -1.4 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 
2005Q2 1.3 -2.2 -2.9 -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 0.8 
2005Q3 0.4 -2.6 -1.9 -0.9 -0.8 -1.0 -1.9 
2005Q4 1.1 -4.3 -1.2 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3 
2006Q1 -1.4 -0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.5 
2006Q2 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 
2006Q3 -0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
2006Q4 -0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 
2007Q1 -0.2 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.6 
2007Q2 -0.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
2007Q3 -0.3 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 
2007Q4 -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 7: Euro Area, Main Features of Forecasta 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Annual percentage changes 
Volumes   
Consumption 1.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 
Private investment -1.9 -3.1 0.6 2.1 2.1 4.0 3.5 
Government expenditure 2.3 2.4 1.7 0.9 1.5 2.3 1.6 
Stockbuildingb -0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
Total domestic demand 0.8 0.3 1.3 1.9 1.6 2.3 1.9 
Export volumes 3.6 1.7 1.2 5.9 3.9 6.6 5.4 
Import volumes 1.8 0.4 3.0 6.2 4.7 6.8 5.3 
GDP 1.9 1.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.0 
Average earnings 3.7 3.5 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.3 3.3 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Private consumption deflator 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.2 
Real personal disposable income 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.6 0.6 1.0 1.8 
 Levels 
Standardised unemployment %  7.8 8.3 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.1 7.8 
Government financial balancec -1.9 -2.6 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 
Government debtc 69.3 69.2 70.4 70.8 71.6 70.5 69.2 
Current accountc -0.3 0.8 0.5 0.6 -0.4 -0.7 -0.3 
a See footnote a of Annex table 1. 
b Change as percentage of GDP.  
 
c As a percentage of GDP.  
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Annex Table 8: Real GDP in the European Union a 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.0 1.4 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.3 
Belgium 1.5 0.9 2.4 1.5 1.9 1.8 
Denmark 0.5 0.7 1.9 3.4 2.8 2.7 
Finland 2.1 2.4 3.5 2.2 3.8 2.8 
France 1.3 0.9 2.1 1.4 2.2 2.0 
Germany 0.1 -0.2 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.5 
Greece 3.8 4.6 4.7 3.7 3.2 3.3 
Ireland 6.1 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.4 
Italy 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 
Netherlands 0.1 -0.1 1.7 0.9 3.0 3.1 
Portugal 0.5 -1.2 1.2 0.4 0.9 2.2 
Spain 2.7 3 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.1 
Sweden 2.0 1.8 3.2 2.7 3.4 3.3 
United Kingdom 2.0 2.5 3.2 1.8 2.4 2.7 
Poland 1.4 3.8 5.3 3.2 4.2 4.6 
Hungary 3.8 3.4 4.5 4.1 4.0 3.9 
Czech Republic 1.5 3.2 4.7 6.0 5.4 4.6 
Estonia 7.2 6.7 7.8 9.7 7.1 6.4 
Latvia 6.4 7.5 8.4 8.9 7.4 6.8 
Lithuania 6.8 10.5 7.0 7.5 6.3 5.8 
Slovak Republic 4.6 4.5 5.5 6.0 5.4 4.9 
Slovenia 3.3 2.5 4.6 3.9 4.0 4.4 
       
Euro Area 1.0 0.7 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.0 
EU-15 1.2 1.0 2.1 1.5 2.3 2.2 
NMS-10 2.7 4.6 5.6 4.6 4.7 4.6 
EU-25 1.2 1.2 2.2 1.6 2.4 2.3 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
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Annex Table 9: Harmonised Inflation in the European Union 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.7 1.3 2.0 2.1 1.7 1.8 
Belgium 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Denmark 2.4 2.0 0.9 1.7 1.8 2.0 
Finland 2.0 1.3 0.2 0.8 1.4 1.6 
France 1.9 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.7 
Germany 1.4 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.6 2.3 
Greece 3.9 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.5 
Ireland 4.7 4.0 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.6 
Italy 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 
Netherlands 3.9 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.9 1.9 
Portugal 3.7 3.2 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.8 
Spain 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.8 
Sweden 1.9 2.3 1.0 0.8 1.6 1.5 
United Kingdom 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.1 2.1 2 
Poland 1.9 0.7 3.6 2.2 1.5 2.4 
Hungary 5.2 4.7 6.8 3.5 2.5 3.0 
Czech Republic 1.4 -0.1 2.6 1.6 2.3 2.1 
Estonia 3.6 1.4 3.0 4.2 3.8 3.0 
Latvia 2.0 2.9 6.2 6.9 5.1 4.0 
Lithuania 0.4 -1.1 1.1 2.7 2.0 2.1 
Slovakia 3.5 8.5 7.4 2.8 2.4 2.6 
Slovenia 7.4 5.7 3.6 2.5 2.1 2.4 
       
Euro Area 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
EU-15 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 1.8 2.2 
NMS-10 2.7 1.9 4.2 2.5 2.0 2.5 
EU-25 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.8 2.2 
 
 
Annex Table 10: Fiscal Balances in the EU-15 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 % GDP 
Austria -0.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 
Belgium 0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 
Denmark 0.3 0.0 1.6 2.3 2.8 1.7 
Finland 4.3 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.7 2.1 
France -3.2 -4.2 -3.7 -3.0 -2.8 -2.7 
Germany -3.8 -4.1 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5 
Greece -4.9 -5.7 -6.5 -4.4 -3.2 -3.1 
Ireland -0.4 0.2 1.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 
Italy -2.9 -3.4 -3.4 -4.1 -4.8 -4.4 
Netherlands -2.0 -3.2 -2.1 -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 
Portugal -2.8 -2.9 -3.0 -6.1 -4.8 -4.1 
Spain -0.3 0.0 -0.2 1.0 0.5 0.4 
Sweden -0.5 -0.1 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.7 
United Kingdom -1.6 -3.2 -3.2 -3.1 -2.6 -2.6 
 
Euro Area -2.6 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 
Eu-15 -2.2 -2.9 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -2.1 
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Annex Table 11: Standardised Unemployment Rate in the European Union 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 % Total labour force 
Austria 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.1 5.3 4.9 
Belgium 7.5 8.2 8.4 8.4 8.9 9.0 
Denmark 4.6 5.4 5.5 4.9 4.4 4.0 
Finland 9.1 9.0 8.9 8.3 8.1 7.7 
France 8.9 9.4 9.6 9.5 9.0 8.7 
Germany 8.2 9.1 9.5 9.5 8.6 8.3 
Greece 10.3 9.7 10.5 10.0. 9.9 9.7 
Ireland 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.3 3.9 3.7 
Italy 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.6 7.7 7.8 
Netherlands 2.8 3.7 4.6 4.8 4.2 3.4 
Portugal 5.0 6.3 6.7 7.6 8.0 7.4 
Spain 11.5 11.5 10.9 9.2 8.6 8.0 
Sweden 4.9 5.6 6.3 6.2 5.7 4.6 
United Kingdom 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.4 
Poland 19.9 19.6 19.0 17.7 16.2 15.1 
Hungary 5.8 5.9 6.1 7.2 7.0 7.2 
Czech Republic 7.3 7.9 8.3 7.9 8.1 6.8 
Estonia 10.3 10.0 9.7 7.8 7.5 8.0 
Latvia 12.2 10.5 10.4 9.0 8.9 9.5 
Lithuania 13.5 12.4 11.4 8.2 6.8 6.2 
Slovakia 18.7 17.6 18.2 16.4 13.8 13.1 
Slovenia 6.3 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.8 
Euro Area 8.3 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.1 7.8 
EU-15 7.6 8.0 8.1 7.8 7.5 7.3 
NMS-10 14.8 14.3 14.2 13.4 12.1 11.3 
EU-25 8.7 8.9 9.0 8.6 8.2 7.9 
 
 
  
 
 
 
2. EUROPEAN POLICY 
MONITORING 
 
Monetary conditions in the Euro Area have deteriorated slightly in recent 
months. The ECB’s key interest rate (the minimum bid rate on the main 
refinancing operations of the Eurosystem) has been raised in two steps since 
the beginning of last December by 50 basis points and stands at 2.50 percent 
since early March. Money market rates (3-month EURIBOR) are also higher 
than in the fall of last year; in the first weeks of March, they reached about 2.70 
percent on average, reflecting the fact that further rate hikes by the ECB are 
currently expected by the market. The real short-term interest rate went up by 
roughly half a percentage point as inflation rates have changed only marginally; 
however, the real rate is still well below its long-term average. Long-term 
interest rates have risen in recent months as well. The yield for 10-year 
government bonds has gone up by about 60 basis points to 3.8 percent from 
its record low in early September 2005. In real terms, the long rates are also 
below their historical average independent of the inflation measure used, be it 
the core rate of inflation or be it inflationary expectations, approximated by the 
ten-year break-even inflation rate for the Euro Area. The level of long-term 
rates is still very low by historical standards and can, at least in part, be 
explained by the ample liquidity in the world economy. The recent rise 
probably also reflects the fact that the near-term outlook for the Euro Area 
economy has improved. Expectations for real GDP growth in 2006 have been 
revised upwards in recent months (see, for example, ECB Monthly Bulletin 
February 2006: 40). The value of the European currency has not changed very 
much against major world currencies in recent months. In real and effective 
terms (EER-42, CPI basis), the depreciation amounted to only about 1 percent 
during the past six months. Therefore, the competitiveness of exporters has 
improved only very little. As far as conditions of financing are concerned, the 
increase of stock prices in recent months implies that financial conditions for 
firms have improved. 
2.1 
Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area 
 
The ECB also looks at the growth rates of money and credit when analysing 
monetary conditions. Monetary aggregates have shown strong growth since 
2004 although M3 growth decelerated slightly in recent months reaching some 
8 percent year-over-year. The narrow aggregate M1 increased at double-digit 
rates. Credits to the private sector grew by almost 10 percent recently 
indicating also the pickup of demand in the Euro Area.  
 
Interest rates and exchange rates are often combined to measure monetary 
conditions in an economy. Many different estimates of the so-called monetary 
conditions index (MCI) are used in the literature and often also by 
international organizations. The idea is to get more information than just from 
one single variable about the stance of monetary policy. Commonly, different 
weights are put on the real effective exchange rate and real interest rates which 
may differ for the purpose of the analysis and also differ across countries due 
to, for example, differences in the degree of openness. The estimates prepared 
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by the institutes are shown in Figure 2.1 for the Euro Area as well as for the 
United States in order to have a comparison. The weights are 5:1 for the real 
interest rate compared to the real effective exchange rate. In the US, monetary 
conditions have become tighter since late 2004 due to a rise in both variables 
after having moved in the very expansive direction in the years before when 
the dollar had depreciated sharply and interest rates had been lowered by the 
Fed. In the Euro Area, while real interest rates have come down quite steadily 
over the past ten years, the MCI measure was strongly affected by the swings 
of the exchange rate. In recent years, the Euro Area MCI showed a tightening 
of monetary conditions between 2002 and 2004; since then, they have 
improved mainly due to the depreciation of the euro. One should be cautious, 
however, when interpreting the level of the MCI itself. If the zero line in the 
figure is seen as a “neutral” policy, the MCI confirms the judgement made 
above that monetary conditions are still accommodative. 
 
Figure 2.1: Monetary Conditions for the Euro Area and the US 
 
 
Monetary conditions for the Euro Area 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Index
Real effective exchange rate,
deviation from trend*
Real interest rates** 
 
  
Monetary conditions for the US 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
Index
Real effective exchange rate, 
as deviation from trend*
Real interest rates** 
  
 
36 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
Another way of looking at the stance of monetary policy is the Taylor rule. In 
March this year, the short-term money market rate was roughly in line with the 
rate which is derived from the Taylor rule.1 In Table 2.1, several different 
calculations of the Taylor rate are reported for the year 2005. For the 
equilibrium real rate of interest we assume, following theoretical 
considerations, that it is equal to the estimated growth rate of potential output. 
Even though estimates concerning potential output growth vary, the calculated 
Taylor rates do not differ much.2 According to the rule, the money market rate 
should have been between 2.4 and 2.6 percent in 2005 on average instead of 
the actual rate of 2.2 percent (Table 2.1). In addition, in spite of the different 
assumptions about potential output growth, the results for the calculated 
“neutral” rate of interest are quite similar. Given the Taylor rule, this rate 
should prevail when the output gap is closed and the inflation rate is on target. 
According to the various calculations, this rate is estimated to be between 3.4 
and 3.7 percent. Of course, there is a lot of uncertainty concerning the crucial 
variables. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to say that the stance of monetary 
policy in the Euro Area can be considered accommodative also by this 
measure. 
Table 2.1: Various Calculations of the Taylor Rate and the Neutral Interest Rate 
in the Euro Area 2005a 
                          
Method 
Potential growth
( =ˆ  real rate) Output gap Taylor rate Neutral rate 
OECD estimate 1.9 –1.5 2.5 3.7 
HP filter 1.6 –0.3 2.8 3.4 
IfW estimate 1.8 –1.5 2.4 3.6 
IMF estimate 1.9 –1.6 2.5 3.7 
NiGEM 1.6 –0.6 2.6 3.4 
aThe inflation target is assumed to be 1.8 percent. The Taylor rate is calculated for the core rate of 
inflation (HICP excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco). The core rate of inflation was 1.5 
percent in 2005. 
 
We expect that the ECB will continue to raise key rates in the near future. 
There are several reasons why the ECB will tighten policy somewhat. One is 
that inflation has remained above the target for a long time – albeit moderately, 
and in the recent survey reported by the ECB inflation forecasts were raised 
slightly compared to the previous one; the same applies to the staff projections 
of early March. Also, the monetary overhang which the ECB interprets as one 
leading indicator for future inflation increased further due to persistently high 
money growth. And finally, following weak growth in the last quarter of 2005, 
the Euro Area economy seems to have picked up in the first quarter of 2006 
and we forecast GDP to grow by more than 2% in 2006 which will make some 
further tightening of interest rates likely. For example, in terms of the Taylor 
                                                 
1 As in our previous report, we use the Taylor rule in its original version (Taylor 1993):  
(1) i = r + π + 0.5 (π – π*) + 0.5 (y – y*), 
with i being the nominal interest rate, r the equilibrium real interest rate, π the rate of inflation, 
π* the inflation target, y actual real GDP, and y* potential real GDP. We assume an inflation 
target of 1.8 percent which is consistent with the ECB’s target of inflation close to but below 2 
percent. The core rate of inflation (HICP excl. processed food and energy) is used because it 
appears to be a better orientation for monetary policy because volatile prices are largely 
excluded. For the output gap, various estimates are reported in the table. 
2 This is due to the fact that there are compensating factors. For example, a high growth rate of 
potential output implies that the negative output gap is larger which would lead to a lower 
interest rate according to the Taylor rule. However, the Taylor rate is raised by the fact that the 
equilibrium real rate of interest is higher. 
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rule discussed above, capacity utilisation in the Euro Area is likely to increase 
(the negative output gap is shrinking), which implies that interest rates should 
rise in response. However, the ECB will probably proceed very cautiously. Key 
interest rates will be raised by only 50 basis points until mid-2007, also because 
inflation is not likely to accelerate. The small increase in inflation that will 
result from the increase in VAT in Germany in January 2007, is assumed not 
to provoke a reaction from the ECB as it should be regarded as a 
predominantly temporary effect since second round effects from this measure 
should be limited. Another reason for expecting only a modest increase of key 
interest rates is that the economic expansion will lose some momentum in the 
course of 2007 according to our forecast. 
 
This section provides a brief assessment of the short-term budgetary prospects 
in the euro area. We will focus as in last year’s EUROFRAME-EFN Spring 
report on the budgetary prospects we expect as compared with the updates of 
the Stability programmes (SPs) released at the turn of the year. We will address 
successively GDP growth scenarios, deficits targets and the fiscal stance of the 
euro area.  
2.2 Fiscal Policy 
in the Euro Area 
GROWTH PROSPECTS   
We expect euro area GDP to grow by 2.2 per cent this year and 2.0 per cent 
next year. These numbers are indeed very similar with the SPs where euro area 
GDP is forecast to grow by 2.1 per cent this year and 2.0 per cent next year 
(see Table 2.2). So for the first time since the economic slowdown initiated in 
late 2000, euro area GDP growth forecast in the SP may turn out to be slightly 
pessimistic this year, at least for 2006. This contrasts sharply with last year 
when SPs looked optimistic at the euro area level as compared with 
EUROFRAME-EFN and also other forecasts: we then expected euro area 
GDP to grow by 1.5 per cent and 2005 and 2.0 per cent in 2006, as compared 
to 2.3 and 2.4 announced in the SPs.  
Table 2.2. Euro area GDP growth and general government balances according 
to the stability programmes 
 
1. EUROFRAME-EFN, Spring 2006 Forecast. 
 
 GDP growth assumptions (per cent) General government balance (per cent of GDP) 
 Stability Programmes Actual Stability Programmes Actual 
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06  J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06  
98 2.8        2.8 -2.1 -1.9       -2.3 
99 2.5 2.2       2.8 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2      -1.3 
00 2.6 2.8 3.3      3.9 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8     -1.0 
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5    1.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6    -1.9 
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0    0.9  -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2    -2.6 
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6   0.7  -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7   -3.0 
04   2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.0  1.8   0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7  -2.8 
05    2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.41    0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.6 -2.41
06     2.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.21     -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -2.4 -2.41
07      2.5 2.4 2.0 2.01      -0.9 -1.3 -1.9   -2.21
08       2.4 2.2 –       -1.0 -1.4 – 
09        2.2 –        -0.9 – 
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The macroeconomic scenarios of the SPs are judged broadly realistic by 
EUROFRAME-EFN for most euro area countries. At country levels our 
forecasts are generally close to those of the SPs. Germany is one of the main 
exceptions: we expect a higher German GDP growth than announced in the 
SP for this year (2.3 per cent instead of 1.5 per cent) and next (1.5 instead of 
1.0).3 We also expect GDP to grow more rapidly than announced in the 
Netherlands (around 3 per cent in 2006 and 2007 as compared to 2.5 in the 
SP), Finland (3.8 per cent in 2006 instead of 3.2 but this reflects the effects of 
the dispute in the paper industry in the summer of 2005). In contrast, we 
expect GDP growth to remain subdued in Italy at around 1.0 per cent this year 
and 1.4 per cent next year instead of 1.5 forecast in the Italian SP. Our GDP 
growth forecasts are also significantly lower than those of the Governments in 
Greece and Portugal. 
 
DEFICIT TARGETS 
We expect the deficit targets announced in the SPs will be met at the euro area 
level in 2006, with the aggregate deficit amounting to 2.4 per cent of GDP but 
slightly higher deficits in 2007: 2.2 per cent of GDP instead of 1.9 per cent in 
the SPs.  
 
Among the countries running deficits of at least 3 per cent of GDP in 2005, 
we expect the deficit targets announced in the SPs to be met in Germany and 
France this year and next year. This would not be the case for Greece, Italy 
and Portugal.  
 
The target announced by the German government will be met due to higher 
than announced growth and despite a less contractionary than announced 
fiscal stance in 2006. The German deficit would reach 2.5 per cent of GDP in 
2007. The latest developments of the German budget are described in Box 1.3 
in Chapter 1. We expect broadly similar than announced GDP growth and 
fiscal impulses for France, bringing the deficit at around 2.7 per cent of GDP 
in 2007. On the contrary, weaker than announced GDP growth but especially 
less restrictive than announced policies will keep the government deficit rising 
in Italy in 2006. In our forecast, the higher expected deficit for Italy is mainly 
due to an estimated much worse behaviour of the public balance trend and to 
lower estimates of the budget law measures, from both the revenues side 
(control of tax evasion), and the expenditure side (savings on the health care 
expenditure and on the compensation of civil servants). As the elections due 
this Spring increase the uncertainties around fiscal measures for 2007 (see Box 
1.4 in Chapter 1), we expect the deficit to be cut by 0.4 percentage point to 
around 4.4 per cent of GDP, that we consider the minimum target whatever 
new government will meet. 
 
Up to our forecast horizon, Greece and Portugal will reduce their deficits 
under the effects of contractionary fiscal policies but less rapidly than 
anticipated in the SP mainly because of lower than expected GDP growth. 
Direct and indirect tax increases are announced in both countries’ SPs for 2006 
and 2007, but we do not expect they will be as strong as anticipated in the SP 
due to lower than announced GDP growth.  
 
In the other euro area countries, deficits targets will almost be met, both in 
2006 and 2007. In Spain, strong economic growth will keep on maintaining the 
government balance in surplus. 
                                                 
3 It should be noted however that EUROFRAME-EFN figures are working day adjusted and 
this implies they are all other things being equal 0.2 percentage points higher in both years than 
the figures of the government which forecasts unadjusted annual figures. 
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One-off measures are expected to phase-out in most countries (see table 2.4). 
One-off measures reducing the deficit are still expected for 2006 in France 
(0.2% of GDP after 0.5%), Italy (0.3 after 0.5) and Belgium (0.6 after 0.4). The 
Portuguese SP has confirmed the commitment not to use them in order to 
achieve budgetary consolidation, contrary to the past when one-off measures 
contributed to a large extent to the reduction of the deficit. At the area level, 
one-off measures are expected to amount to 0% of GDP in 2007, after 0.2 in 
2005 and 0.1 in 2006. 
EXPECTED FISCAL STANCE 
Table 2.3 shows an estimate of the fiscal stance in the euro area, based on SPs 
updates. Up to 2009, the fiscal stance is expected to be contractionary at the 
euro area level for all years and for almost all countries. The fiscal 
contractionary impact would on average amount to an annual 0.4 per cent of 
GDP. 
 
In terms of years, the contraction would be stronger in 2007 (0.7 per cent of 
GDP), reflecting a particularly strong planned effort in Germany (1.2 per cent), 
Italy (1.1 per cent) and Portugal (1.1 per cent). All countries running higher 
than 3% of GDP deficits in 2005 have announced contractionary measures of 
at least 0.5 percentage point per year until 2009 (Germany, France, Italy, 
Portugal) or 2008 (Greece). The fiscal stance is announced to be restrictive or 
neutral in a majority of euro area countries according to the SPs. Fiscal policy 
would be slightly expansionary this year and to a smaller extent next year in 
Spain, the Netherlands, Finland and Ireland.  
 
Table 2.4 shows two estimates of the fiscal stance in the euro area, based on 
EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth and government deficits. The 
assessment of the fiscal stance depends not only on GDP growth and 
government balances, but also on potential growth estimates that may vary 
significantly from one method to another. In Table 2.4, one estimate uses 
potential output growth taken from the latest SPs, implying a potential output 
growth of around 2% for the euro area as whole. The other estimate uses 
NiGEM figures that suggest euro area trend output growing by around 1.7% 
this year and next year. The two associated fiscal stances are shown to provide 
some bounds of the fiscal stance underway in the euro area. 
 
Using latest SPs potential output growth assumptions, fiscal policy will be 
close to neutral this year before turning again slightly contractionary at the 
euro area level in 2007, dampening economic growth by an annual 0.3 
percentage point of GDP: we expect a less contractionary stance than 
announced in the SPs. The expected fiscal stance may be judged closer to 
neutral using NiGEM estimates. 
 
Both measures however suggest that fiscal policy will become slightly more 
restrictive at the euro area level in 2007 than in 2006. This will be especially 
true for two of the countries currently running the larger deficits: Germany and 
Italy. In Italy, after two years of fiscal contraction we expect some slightly 
expansive fiscal impulse this year contrary to the strong negative impulse 
announced in the SP, but Italian fiscal policy will be tightened again in 2007. 
Over the forecast horizon, we expect the fiscal stance to be restrictive in all 
countries running higher than 3% deficits, while it will be neutral or slightly 
expansionary in the other countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Spain 
and the Netherlands.  
 
  
 
40 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
The agreement reached on the Stability and Growth Pact by the European 
Council of 22-23 March 2005 seems not to have affected the conduct of fiscal 
policy in the European Union. 
Table 2.3: GDP growth, fiscal balances and fiscal impulses in the updates of 
the stability programmes, end 2005 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.8 1.8 
France 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Italy 1.2 0.0 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.8 
Spain 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2* 
The Netherlands 1.7 0.8 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.3* 
Belgium 2.6 1.4 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2 
Austria 2.4 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.5 2.5* 
Finland 3.6 2.1 3.2 2.6 2.3 2.1 
Portugal 1.2 0.5 1.1 1.8 2.4 3.0 
Greece 4.7 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.0* 
Ireland 4.5 4.6 4.8 5.0 4.8 4.8* 
Luxemburg 4.4 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.9* 
Euro area 2.1 1.4 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3.7 -3.3 -3.3 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 
France -3.7 -3.0 -2.9 -2.6 -1.9 -1.0 
Italy -3.2 -4.3 -3.5 -2.8 -2.1 -1.5 
Spain -0.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6* 
The Netherlands -2.1 -1.2 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1* 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 
Austria -1.0 -1.9 -1.7 -0.8 0.0 0.0* 
Finland 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 
Portugal -3.0 -6.0 -4.6 -3.7 -2.6 -1.5 
Greece -6.6 -4.3 -2.6 -2.3 -1.7 -1.3* 
Ireland 1.4 0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8* 
Luxemburg -1.2 -2.3 -1.8 -1.0 -0.2 -0.2* 
Euro area -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -1.9 -1.4 -0.9 
Fiscal impulse, per cent of GDP (1)
Germany   -0.8 -0.1 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5 
France  -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 
Italy  -0.1 -0.7 -1.1 -0.6 -0.5 
Spain  -0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0* 
The Netherlands  -0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1* 
Belgium  0.5 0.6 -0.7 -0.1 0.0 
Austria  0.8 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 0.2* 
Finland  -0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Portugal  0.1 -2.5 -1.1 -0.9 -0.6 
Greece  -2.2 -0.9 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3* 
Ireland  -0.6 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0* 
Luxemburg  0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 0.3* 
Euro area  -0.5 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 
(1) Excluding one-off measures, as estimated by EUROFRAME-EFN (see table 2.4, for data 
up 2007. No one-off measures are expected for 2008 and 2009). The fiscal impulse is 
estimated here as the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, as 
estimated by the SP and excluding one-off measures.  
*Own assumptions. 
Sources: Stability programmes, Seventh updates, end 2005, own assumptions. 
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Table 2.4. GDP growth, fiscal balances in the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast and 
fiscal impulses under two estimates 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany -0.2 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.5 
France 0.9 2.1 1.4 2.2 2.0 
Italy 0.4 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 
Spain 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.1 
The Netherlands -0.1 1.7 0.9 3.0 3.1 
Belgium 0.9 2.4 1.5 1.9 1.8 
Austria 1.4 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.3 
Finland 2.4 3.5 2.2 3.8 2.8 
Portugal -1.2 1.2 0.4 0.9 2.2 
Greece 4.6 4.7 3.7 3.2 3.3 
Ireland 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.7 4.4 
Euro area-11 (1) 0.8 1.8 1.4 2.2 2.0 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -4.1 -3.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.5 
France -4.2 -3.7 -3.0 -2.8 -2.7 
Italy -3.4 -3.4 -4.1 -4.8 -4.4 
Spain 0.0 -0.2 1.0 0.5 0.4 
The Netherlands -3.2 -2.1 -0.5 -1.0 -0.6 
Belgium 0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 
Austria -1.3 -1.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.5 
Finland 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.7 2.1 
Portugal -2.9 -3.0 -6.1 -4.8 -4.1 
Greece -5.7 -6.5 -4.4 -3.2 -3.1 
Ireland 0.2 1.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 
Euro area-11 -3.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 
One-off measures, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0.1 0.5 0.2 0 
Italy 2.0 1.3 0.5 0.3 0 
Spain 0 -0.7 0 0 0 
The Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 2.5 2.3 0.2 0 0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0 
Ireland 0 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0 
Euro area-11  0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Fiscal impulse, under SP potential output growth assumptions, per cent of 
GDP (2)
Germany  -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.1 -0.5 
France 0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 
Italy 0.9 -0.6 -0.5 0.3 -0.6 
Spain 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 0.6 0.1 
The Netherlands 0.5 -0.9 -1.6 0.9 0.2 
Belgium -0.2 1.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 
Austria 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.2 
Finland 1.8 0.5 -1.1 0.5 0.8 
Portugal -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -2.5 -0.7 
Greece 1.7 1.6 -2.0 -1.3 -0.1 
Ireland -1.6 -1.3 -0.3 0.3 -0.2 
Euro area-11 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 
Fiscal impulse, under NiGEM trend output growth assumptions, per cent of 
GDP (3)
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Germany  -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 
France 0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 
Italy 1.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.4 -0.5 
Spain -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.7 0.3 
The Netherlands 0.5 -1.0 -1.5 0.8 0.0 
Belgium -0.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Austria 0.6 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.1 
Finland 2.1 0.5 -1.0 0.4 0.7 
Portugal 0.4 0.5 0.8 -2.0 -0.6 
Greece 1.4 1.3 -2.0 -1.1 0.2 
Ireland -1.1 -0.7 0.4 0.9 0.1 
Euro area-11 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.1 
(1) Excluding Luxembourg. (2) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse is the opposite of 
the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN 
forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with potential output growth 
as in the stability programmes. (3) Excluding one-off measures. Fiscal impulse here is the 
opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, derived from 
EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off measures, with 
trend output growth as in NiGEM 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Spring 2006 forecast, Stability programmes, seventh updates, 
end 2005, Eurostat, own assumptions. 
 
 
 2.3 Progress on 
the Lisbon 
Agenda- 
Relaunch of the 
Lisbon Strategy 
NATIONAL REFORM PROGRAMMES 
The renewed Lisbon strategy focuses on two tasks: growth and jobs. Social 
cohesion and environmental goals may be better achieved in a favourable 
economic climate. The integration of economic and employment guidelines is 
a logical consequence of the focus on the two major tasks.  
 
The Commission is initiating policy, the Member States are delivering 
programmes in which they specify their reform plans. This shift in emphasis 
from targets to policy measures is a clear improvement. But so far, these 
important national reform programmes are not much debated in parliaments 
and in the public. This deficit in many Member States should be eliminated. 
 
REVISION OF THE SHORTLIST OF STRUCTURAL INDICATORS 
The EU structural indicators provide useful statistics for assessing progress 
towards meeting the Lisbon objectives. The short-list of 14 structural 
indicators by and large meets the requirements formulated by the Economic 
Policy Committee. They are policy-relevant, easy to comprehend and broadly 
comparable internationally. The risk that governments lose sight of their 
economic policy by focusing on “window dressing” with regard to the 
indicators is diminished by the implementation of the National Reform 
Programmes. 
 
Unfortunately, the EU structural indicators are sometimes misused for the 
purpose of an international “beauty contest”. Some countries are proud of the 
level reached, others of the development of indicators in recent years.   
 
There is one indicator in the shortlist of structural indicators which does not 
seem to be appropriate: the relative price level of the consumption of private 
households (in relation to the EU average). A low relative price level is 
supposed to reflect high intensity of competition and thus the success of 
economic reforms. However, there is a very close positive correlation between 
the relative price level and GDP per head (see Figure 2.2). The indicator is a 
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proxy for GDP per head and not measuring the degree of competitiveness. It 
should be replaced in this year’s revision process.  
 
Figure 2.2 GDP Per Capita and Price Levels, Comparison of EU-25 Countries, 
 Source: Euro
EU25=100 
stat, WIFO 
CHIEVEMENTS IN THE ISBON PROCESS
e the level of GDP per 
here was some achievement on the labour market due to higher flexibility. 
PERATIONALISING COMPETITIVENESS
he European Union is striving to become the most competitive region in the 
roductivity appears to be one of the best indicators of competitiveness. GDP 
here is no explicit target for productivity increases in the EU. However, if the 
he Lisbon strategy gives equal importance to increasing both, productivity 
and employment through higher competitiveness. In dynamic industries, a rise 
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One of the key goals of the Lisbon strategy is to rais
head, with particular attention being paid to the US as a benchmark. Since 
economic growth in the EU fell behind this target, the Lisbon process was 
sometimes called a failure.  
 
T
The employment rate, particularly for women and older workers, increased in 
many Member States. This was, however, mainly achieved by additional part-
time work. Full-time employment decreased in the EU  from 139.5 million   in 
2002 to 138.7 million in 2004. As the majority of unemployed is looking for 
full-time jobs, this is one of the reasons for the stickiness of unemployment 
due to lack of effective demand. 
O  
 
T
world. But what is most competitive? 
 
P
per hour and total factor productivity are the most useful concepts. But due to 
statistical limitations, GDP per employee is commonly used.  
 
T
"informal" targets for economic growth (3 percent per annum.) and the 
employment rate were achieved, this would imply a productivity increase of 
slightly more than 1 percent per year. This is not sufficient to become the most 
competitive economy in the world. 
 
T
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in productivity can enhance employment. However, in recent years of under-
utilised resources there existed a temporary trade-off between employment and 
productivity in some Member States: The increase in employment was 
achieved at the cost of productivity developments. Productivity can also be 
affected by labour market conditions: High unemployment may exert 
downward pressure on productivity since the unemployed have to accept low-
productivity jobs. Shortage of labour, on the other hand, raises productivity 
since jobs at the lower-productivity end disappear.  
 
There are explicit targets for several factors behind productivity growth:  
• Research and development is targeted at 3% of GDP. So far, 
ent 
 
Besides on there is a crucial effect of investment on growth. 
vestment is reflecting demand and supply conditions - capacity utilisation 
ess? One reason may be the 
s the internal market strategy. 
cal and monetary stabilisation policies. The 
aastricht criteria must be met by the members of the Euro area - if not, there 
lity 
d Growth Pact there are no institutions to force the achievement of targets. 
ention of national governments is devoted to the Stability and 
rowth Pact, much less to the Lisbon Agenda. Many Member States cannot 
ean Market and the Growth and Stability Pact, the 
sbon Agenda has not captured so much interest of a wider academic 
improvement in this most important field was rather limited.  
• The share of young people without further educational attainment is 
to be cut by one half. Here again, there was hardly any improvem
in recent years. 
R&D and educati
In
and reform policy. Higher investment in machinery and employment is 
necessary to make use of higher R&D and education. In the Euro area, 
however, the rate of business investment has declined since 2000. Moreover, 
infrastructure investment was cut in many countries to achieve the Maastricht 
criteria.  
HIERARCHY OF POLICIES IN THE EU 
Why had the Lisbon Agenda only limited succ
institutional setting. Top priority in the EU ha
The basic four freedoms of goods, capital, services and labour markets have to 
be accomplished according to European law. There may be transition periods, 
but no exceptions at the end.  
 
High priority is given to fis
M
are sanctions. Monetary policy is carried out by the ECB according to law.  
 
The Lisbon strategy is given low priority in the EU. In contrast to the Stabi
an
There is now even some discussion on dropping the goal for economic growth 
since it is not achieved. Who is in charge of the Lisbon process? [OMC] The 
open method of coordination has been adopted, but sometimes responsibilities 
have been muddled between the EU and its Member States. Thus, from an 
institutional perspective, the limited success of the Lisbon strategy is not a 
surprise. 
 
Much att
G
increase their expenditures on R&D, education and infrastructure and at the 
same time reduce their fiscal deficit which is “suffered” by low growth (i.e. by 
the cyclical component). 
  
Unlike the Single Europ
Li
community. But this is not the fault of the Lisbon Agenda. Many economists 
have thought that the free internal market together with sound 
macroeconomic policies would automatically lead to higher economic growth.  
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3. CONVERGENCE AND 
INTEGRATION OF THE 
NEW MEMBER STATES TO 
THE EURO AREA 
In May 2004, ten new member states joined the European Union, of which 
eight were former transition economies. The new member states are now 
members of EMU with a derogation regarding the introduction of the 
common currency. They do not have a right to opt out as Denmark and the 
United Kingdom and are hence obliged to prepare for the adoption of the 
euro. This includes meeting the nominal convergence criteria, i.e. low inflation 
and long-term interest rates, fiscal deficits not exceeding 3% of GDP, 
government debt below 60% of GDP, and exchange rate stability against the 
euro assessed through the participation in the ERM-II for a period of at least 
two years without devaluing against the euro1. Despite the general obligation to 
adopt the euro, no concrete date was set by which the countries had to have 
fulfilled these convergence criteria. The countries have some room as regards 
the exact timing and implementation of policies during the preparation phase 
since the precise entry date to the euro area may differ across individual 
countries. Most new member states aim at an early entry. Seven countries have 
already fixed their exchange rates within the ERM-II (cf. Table 1); three of 
which (Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia) are preparing to adopt the euro in 
January 2007. The Czech Republic plans to enter ERM-II in autumn of 20072. 
The remaining two countries have not yet indicated a target entry date to 
ERM-II. 
3.1 Introduction 
Table 3.1: ERM-II Entry and Targeted Date of Euro Adoption 
 ERM-II entry Targeted date of euro adoption 
Cyprus May-05 2007 – 2008 
Czech Republic Autumn 2007 2010 
Estonia Jun-04 2007 
Hungary   2010 
Latvia May-05 2008 
Lithuania Jun-04 2007 
Malta May-05 2008 
Poland   2010 
Slovakia Nov-05 2009 
Slovenia Jun-04 2007 
 
1 In addition, the convergence performance will include the examination of the compatibility of 
national legislation with the Treaty and with the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) and of the European Central Bank (ECB). Although not necessary conditions for 
the adoption of the euro, additional factors relevant to economic integration and convergence 
will be also assessed including financial and product market integration and the balance of 
payments. 
2 Cf. Czech Ministry of Finance, November 2005. 
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The adoption of the euro by the new member states will not only significantly 
change the policy options available to them, but it may also bear on the euro 
area as a whole. The new member states, the eight former transition economies 
in particular, are undergoing a process of catch-up growth. Their main 
economic concern is to facilitate a smooth process of convergence in income 
levels with the current euro area. For a number of years now they have 
recorded growth rates exceeding that of the euro area by a wide margin. 
Whereas growth in the euro area amounted to close to 2% during the past five 
years, the Central European countries grew on average by 3-5% and the Baltic 
States by 7% per annum. Once converted to euros at the current exchange rate, 
even higher growth rates have been experienced in GDP per capita terms 
ranging from 5% in Slovenia to 13% in the Baltic states, Hungary and Slovakia 
(cf. Table 3.2). Being a member of the monetary union offers many chances 
and benefits for catching up in income levels; on the other hand, the fixed 
exchange rate and the common interest rate also bear risks and challenges. In 
addition, EMU affects available fiscal policy options under the constraints of 
the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
Table 3.2: GDP and population in the enlarged euro area 
 
Population 
in  
millions Population 
GDP EUR 
million 
GDP in 
EUR 
GDP/cap in 
EUR  
GDP/cap in 
EUR  
GDP/cap 
in EUR  
GDP/cap 
in PPS 
GDP/cap in 
PPS 
Real GDP, 
national 
currency 
2004 
share of 
EU-22 2004 share of EU-22 2004 1995 
ave growth 
rate between 
2000 and 
2004 2004 1995 
ave growth 
rate between 
2000 and 
2004 2004 
Germany 82.5 21.4 2215650 27.1 26900 23600 1.9 24600 18500 1.2 
France 62.2 16.1 1648369 20.1 26500 20200 3.1 24800 17600 2.1 
Italy 58.2 15.1 1351328 16.5 23200 15000 3.4 23300 17900 0.9 
Spain 42.7 11.1 837316 10.2 19600 11600 6.2 22100 13500 3.5 
Netherlands 16.3 4.2 488642 6.0 30000 20500 4.9 28200 18200 1.3 
Belgium 10.4 2.7 288089 3.5 27700 21400 3.5 26800 18700 2.0 
Austria 8.2 2.1 237039 2.9 29000 23100 3.0 27800 19500 1.8 
Greece 11.1 2.9 167169 2.0 15100 8500 6.9 18400 10900 4.4 
Finland 5.2 1.4 149725 1.8 28600 19600 4.1 25400 16100 2.9 
Ireland 4.1 1.1 148557 1.8 36600 14300 8.7 31000 15200 6.1 
Portugal 10.5 2.7 142297 1.7 13500 8700 3.8 16300 11600 1.3 
Luxembourg  0.5 0.1 25664 0.3 56600 33800 5.6 51200 27000 4.1 
           
EU12 312 80.8 7728235 94.4 24800 18300 3.5 24000 17000 1.9 
           
Poland 38.2 9.9 203711 2.5 5300 2800 5.7 11100 6300 3.2 
Czech R 10.2 2.6 86787 1.1 8500 4100 9.6 15900 10600 3.1 
Hungary 10.1 2.6 81115 1.0 8000 3300 12.8 13600 7500 4.4 
Slovakia 5.4 1.4 33119 0.4 6200 2800 12.2 11700 6800 4.1 
Slovenia 2.0 0.5 26146 0.3 13100 7800 5.1 17900 10500 3.4 
Lithuania 3.4 0.9 18083 0.2 5300 1300 12.9 10800 5200 7.1 
Cyprus 0.7 0.2 12533 0.2 16900 10800 5.2 18800 12500 3.4 
Latvia 2.3 0.6 11167 0.1 4800 1500 11.7 9700 4500 7.7 
Estonia 1.4 0.4 9043 0.1 6700 2000 12.0 11600 5200 7.2 
Malta 0.4 0.1 4269 0.1 10600  2.5 15700  1.3 
           
EU22 386  8185817        
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The enlargement of the euro area may not affect the new entrants alone. 
Although the new member states are rather small economies with a combined 
GDP at current prices of 6% of the enlarged euro area (cf. Table 2), 
heterogeneity in growth and inflation rates will further increase. This may raise 
the risk that not all countries will benefit to the same extent from the single 
currency given that monetary policy might not be appropriate to the cyclical 
position in all individual member states at any given time. The process of 
monetary integration has already provoked a debate and a large body of 
literature3, on both the consequences of the euro area enlargement and the 
preparation process. Similar to the case before the inception of the current 
euro area, the main focus is – whether monetary union is a suitable framework 
for countries at different stages of development or with varying economic 
structures that may have different needs as regards monetary policy and 
exchange rate flexibility. 
 
This report tries to evaluate some consequences of the euro area enlargement 
on both the entrants and the monetary union as a whole. Firstly, it summarises 
how membership in a monetary union affects the participating countries. 
Secondly, the main challenges for the new member states are reviewed, in 
particular their potential additional adjustment needs arising due to the process 
of catch up growth. It also investigates how the alternative adjustment 
mechanisms such as the labour market, real wage flexibility and fiscal policy 
function. Finally, we address some issues of the preparation process and 
examine the implications for the functioning of the enlarged euro area. 
 
Membership of a monetary union implies that the exchange rate with other 
union members is fixed and that the interest rate is determined in the 
integrated financial market, i.e. it reflects the average conditions in the member 
states. The fixed exchange rate and the common interest rate can at the same time 
imply benefits and risks for the member states of the monetary union. Whether 
the benefits outweigh the costs depends on the characteristics and economic 
policies implemented by the member states.  
3.2 Adjustment 
in the EMU: 
overview of 
issues 
 
The benefits arise from an enhanced functioning of the single market, which is 
supported by higher transparency, a reduction of transaction costs and 
exchange rate risk. The elimination of exchange rate variability is expected to 
lead to an increase in trade between the member states of a monetary union4. 
In particular for small open economies, macroeconomic volatility stemming 
from exchange rate fluctuations might be reduced. The SGP requirement of a 
balanced budget on average may reduce interest payments from debt servicing 
thereby further supporting economic growth. For the countries in the process 
of catching up, membership of the euro area may serve to lower interest rates 
and allow better access to foreign financing5 as the capital markets in the 
current euro area are deeper, more liquid and more transparent. Moreover, the 
countries are protected against currency crisis.  
 
The potential costs of monetary union membership arise from the adjustment 
to changing supply and demand conditions, as is the case after shocks or 
during the growth process and the business cycle. Traditionally, the costs of 
joining a monetary union have been judged by the optimum currency area 
 
3 See for example de Grauweand Lavrac (1999), Schadler et al. (2005); Detken et al. (2005), 
Dabrowski and Rostowski (2006)  
4 Schadler et al. (2005, p. 15) report gains in trade for the new member states of up to 60% in 
the next twenty years due to euro area membership. 
5 Reciprocally, the investment opportunities combined with higher transparency and lower 
exchange rate risk are an advantage for investors. 
  
 
50 CONVERGENCE AND INTEGRATION OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES TO THE EURO AREA    
(OCA) criteria and focus on adjustment processes after asymmetric shocks, i.e. a 
sudden change in economic conditions that causes deviations between supply 
and demand in one country. To maintain a given employment level, a change in 
the real wage will be needed to adjust to a permanent change in the demand 
and supply conditions. In the absence of a nominal exchange rate, the 
adjustment in the real exchange rate has to be brought about by the prices and 
wages themselves. If the adjustment of wages and prices is sluggish, 
membership in a monetary union may create costs in terms of unemployment 
and income compared with a situation where the exchange rate reacts flexibly 
instead6. If a shock is merely transitory, in principle fiscal and monetary policy 
may mitigate the impact of the shock on employment and income. However, 
within monetary union, a country cannot adjust the interest rate to its own 
needs, as the rate is determined by the integrated financial market as a whole. 
Fiscal policy alone can be used for demand smoothing. 
 
In the theories of optimum currency areas (Mundell (1961), Kenen (1969), 
McKinnon (1963)), the potential costs of adjustment within a monetary union 
are discussed mainly with reference to asymmetric shocks, i.e. targeting a single 
country of the monetary union and requiring adjustment on the part of this 
country alone. If asymmetric shocks are likely, e.g. based on economic 
structures, foreign trade integration or financial integration, the adjustment 
needs of a country might be different from the rest of the monetary union. 
However, this is not the only situation when the monetary policy stance may 
bear on countries differently. A potential problem for the member states arises 
from the fact that if an asymmetric shock hits a large country, i.e. one that can 
affect the development of the entire union, the central bank might adjust 
interest rates and hence change the monetary conditions for all countries 
involved. In such a situation, the monetary policy response may not be the 
most appropriate for any country. Similar problems arise in the case of a 
symmetric shock to which the individual countries react in an asymmetric 
manner. This can give rise to differences in the cycle between countries and the 
single policy response may become inappropriate for some member states. The 
same holds if monetary policy is transmitted in a different manner and if 
business cycles are not synchronic between the member states. In the worst 
case scenario, the differences may become so large that monetary policy cannot 
react.  
 
Therefore, in a monetary union the interest rate will support adjustment after a 
shock and during the business cycle only if shocks are reacted to in a similar 
manner and the cycles are synchronised. If not, the interest rate may even 
impede smooth adjustment. Moreover, the real interest rate channel may 
exacerbate the effect of an inappropriate monetary policy stance. Countries 
with higher inflation rates face lower real interest rates and vice versa, which 
may lead to higher cyclical volatility and persistence in the cyclical differences 
among the member states (cf. Deroose et al. 2004). Also, adjustment through a 
loss in competitiveness may take more time within a monetary union because 
of easier access to financing current account deficits. This might reduce the 
pressure from declining competitiveness.  
 
In principle, fiscal policy is still available for stabilisation during the cycles. 
However, in the EMU the size of public deficits is regulated by the Stability 
and Growth Pact. In addition, in the absence of coordinated European fiscal 
policy, different fiscal reactions to shocks (either asymmetric or symmetric) or 
differences in fiscal reforms and their impacts on the business cycles in the 
member states might also contribute to asymmetries in the monetary policy 
 
6 This need not be the case even if there is a flexible exchange rate regime. 
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stance among the countries. As a consequence, although some sources of 
macroeconomic volatility such as exchange rate movement among the member 
states are eliminated in the monetary union, macroeconomic volatility might 
even increase as some stabilising channels work in a different way.  
 
The potentially negative effect of the single monetary policy on the adjustment 
to shocks in a monetary union was questioned because of possible endogeneity 
of the OCA criteria (Frankel and Rose 1998). Trade and financial integration 
may be fostered by the inception of monetary union; adjustment through the 
wage determination and price setting may be enhanced (Calmfors 1998; for a 
recent overview of possible endogeneity of structures in a monetary union cf. 
de Grauwe and Mongelli 2005). Financial integration not only allows for 
portfolio diversification and risk sharing, but also increases the correlation of 
markets and the joint susceptibility to shocks. The potential costs of monetary 
union due to ex-ante differences may become smaller after its inception.  
 
Countries undergoing catch-up growth face particular benefits but also adjustment 
and stabilisation challenges when forming a monetary union with more 
developed countries. Catch up growth requires large investments in the capital 
stock of the economy comprising machines and equipment, housing and 
infrastructure. Prudent but vigorous investment decisions are needed for the 
growth potential to materialise; a stable macroeconomic and financial 
environment is needed to secure a smooth growth process. The growth 
process can continue along side capital inflows and current account deficits, 
real currency appreciation, financial deepening and extensive credit growth. All 
these phenomena may be part of the sustainable growth process, but they can 
also indicate unsustainable imbalances. Deviations of supply and demand can 
emerge that might need correction.  
 
Current account deficits may not be a matter of concern if the accompanying 
capital inflows finance efficient investment projects that speed up growth. On 
the other hand, the need to service the foreign (currency) debt and the 
vulnerability to sudden swings in capital flows create challenges for a smooth 
growth process. In particular, emerging economies with shallow financial 
markets are faced with the risk of speculative attacks on their currency. Being a 
member of the euro area will both reduce these risks and the cost of financing 
the growth process through foreign capital, which is an immense benefit for 
the new member states. Nevertheless, current account sustainability is also an 
issue within the euro area through the impact on the debt of households, firms 
and the government. For the growth process to be smooth, sufficient income 
must be produced to service the debt without changes in the real exchange rate 
by adjustments in the real wage. Admittedly, for most of the new member 
states with their restricted nominal exchange rate flexibility and liberalised 
capital flows, the adjustment through the nominal exchange rate is not always 
available anyway. Nevertheless, membership of the euro area may increase the 
risk of large volatility in income and employment because current account 
deficits may become easier to finance.  The needed adjustment process may set 
in only later and with higher swings in output and employment. A similar 
challenge is related to maintaining financial stability in the growth process. 
Membership of the euro area will reduce the cost of investment due to lower 
risk or exchange rate premia, which may boost the convergence in real income 
levels. On the other hand, banks may start to grant credit too easily or may lack 
capacity to monitoring the borrowers sufficiently. Financial stability might be 
endangered if the investments turn out less profitable than expected. All in all, 
the new member states can gain enormously from the membership in the euro 
area, but only if the advantages from the easier financing of the potential growth 
are properly exploited and macroeconomic policies adequately set. 
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Therefore, when trying to evaluate the effects of the enlargement of the euro 
area, it is important on the one hand to study the possible adjustment needs 
and alternative adjustment tools of the new member states, and the 
consequences for heterogeneity in the euro area as a whole on the other.  
 
 3.3 Adjustment 
needs and 
adjustment tools 
in the new 
member states 
LIKELIHOOD OF ASYMMETRIC SHOCKS: SIMILARITIES IN THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
Indicators of optimum currency areas form a starting point for an evaluation of 
the advantages and disadvantages of the membership in monetary union. These 
can be assessed by examining the similarities in the production and 
employment patterns or trade links as proxies for the probability of the 
simultaneous occurrence of a shock.  
 
Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the employment and value added shares of the six main 
sectors in the new member states and the euro area, and the share of the euro 
area in the foreign trade of the new member states7. The data in Tables 3.3 and 
3.4 indicate that the differences in the structure of the economies can be quite 
large in some countries when compared with the euro area. By contrast, the 
new member states are strongly integrated with the euro area through trade. 
This makes it quite likely that the NMS will be affected by shocks hitting the 
euro area; on the other hand the share of the NMS in the euro area’s foreign 
trade is increasing but the direct effect of shocks in these countries on the 
current euro area may be limited.   
 
Table 3.3:  Structure of Employment and Added Value, 2004 
 Employment           Value Added, current prices       
 
Agriculture 
(AB) 
Industry 
(CDE) 
Construction 
(F) 
Trade 
(GHI) 
Finance 
(JK) 
Public 
services 
(L_P) 
Agriculture 
(AB) 
Industry 
(CDE) 
Constructio
n (F) 
Trade 
(GHI) 
Finance 
(JK) 
Public 
services 
(L_P) 
EU12 4.5 18.2 7.5 24.9 15.0 30.0 2.2 20.7 5.9 21.1 27.2 22.8 
CZ 4.2 29.0 8.6 25.6 11.3 21.5 3.3 31.0 6.9 25.4 16.3 17.1 
EE 5.7 27.0 7.6 24.8 7.9 26.8 4.3 22.2 6.7 28.2 20.7 18.0 
CY       3.5 12.0 8.0 28.3 23.9 24.3 
LV 12.5 18.1 8.5 26.9 7.5 26.5 4.1 16.8 5.8 35.4 18.2 19.7 
LT 15.8 20.1 8.0 24.6 4.9 26.6 5.9 25.5 7.2 32.3 12.4 16.8 
HU 5.1 25.0 7.9 25.5 9.2 27.3 3.8 26.1 5.1 20.5 20.5 24.0 
MT       2.3 19.5 4.6 27.6 19.9 26.1 
PL 19.2 22.1 4.7 22.5 9.1 22.3 5.1 25.4 5.6 18.9 7.2 14.9 
SI 10.5 28.4 7.2 21.1 12.5 20.2 2.5 29.5 5.7 21.0 20.3 20.9 
SK 3.9 27.6 6.7 27.5 9.2 25.1 3.9 26.5 5.6 25.8 21.3 16.9 
 
 
Numerous investigations of the convergence of business cycles between the 
Euro Area and the NMS have already been undertaken. However, given the 
short time series of the new member states, estimations of the cycle and the 
effect of shocks are still very uncertain. In a meta-analysis, Fidrmuc and 
Korhonen (2004) find that correlations between the business cycles of CEE 
countries and the euro area are quite high, but depend on the estimation 
methodology. The correlation of supply shocks seems to be higher then that of 
demand shocks (cf. Schadler et al., 2005). In a very comprehensive study, 
 
7 A comprehensive overview of structural similarities and dissimilarities is given in Angeloni et 
al. (2005) 
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Darvas and Szapary (2004) test the development of comovement among euro 
area countries on the one hand, and CEEC countries and the euro area on the 
other. They find first that comovement has increased in the euro area since the 
run-up to monetary union. Second, the comovement has also increased 
between some CEEC since the late 1990s (most notably Slovenia, Hungary and 
Poland), but remains limited in some others (the Baltic states and the Czech 
Republic). 
 
Table 3.4:  Trade Shares, 2005 
   
euro 
area     
EU 
except 
euro 
area     
Extra EU-
25   
 Imports Exports average Imports Exports average Imports Exports average
Czech Rep 62 60 61 19 25 22 19 15 17 
Estonia 46 41 44 30 37 34 24 22 23 
Cyprus 55 49 52 13 20 17 32 31 32 
Latvia 34 24 29 41 53 47 25 23 24 
Lithuania 32 29 31 27 37 32 41 34 38 
Hungary 53 59 56 14 17 16 32 23 28 
Malta 61 37 49 14 14 14 25 48 37 
Poland 58 54 56 17 23 20 25 23 24 
Slovenia 67 53 60 12 13 12 22 34 28 
Slovak Rep 47 53 50 32 32 32 21 14 18 
 
All in all, such tests can give some rough indication of the occurrence of 
asymmetric shocks based on past developments. These however may have 
been dominated by structural change in the transition process. At the same 
time, country specific shocks can hit the new member states because of the 
process of catching up growth, in particular due to real appreciation, 
imbalances between demand and supply connected with capital inflows and 
financial deepening. 
REAL APPRECIATION OF THE CURRENCY 
For a number of years already, all eight new member states that are former 
transition economies have recorded real appreciation vis-à-vis the euro. The 
graphs in the Appendix show the nominal and real exchange rates of these 
countries to the euro (and the euro area) and for effective measures based on a 
different number of trade partners (with the effective rate towards 41 trade 
partners being the most comprehensive one). For every country, there are two 
graphs, one showing the development from 1994, the second beginning in 
2000. Table 5 summarises the development of some indicators of the real and 
nominal exchange rate. 
 
Over the longer horizon, real appreciation has been observed in all countries. 
In the short to medium term however the exchange rate regime and nominal 
exchange rate movements have had some impact on the real exchange rate 
development. In particular in the countries with exchange rates appreciating in 
nominal terms such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and to some extent also 
Hungary, real appreciation has been sizeable since 2000. The large swing in the 
nominal exchange rate of the zloty since 2000 has been reflected in a very 
similar development of the Polish real exchange rate. By contrast, the steady 
depreciation of the Slovene tolar up to mid-2004 was only accompanied by a 
moderate real appreciation. The Baltic states have run fixed exchange rates, 
Estonia only having done so towards the euro (deutsche mark) since the 
inception of its currency board. Lithuania pegged the exchange rate to the euro 
in 2002, Latvia in 2005. Therefore in the latter two cases the exchange rates 
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show variation. A particular case is Latvia. Due to the peg to the SDR before 
2005 it experienced a trend nominal and real depreciation of its currency 
towards the euro area after 2000, which stopped only with the fixing of the 
exchange rate towards the euro. 
 
Table 3.5: Nominal Exchange Rates to the EURφ       
 Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland 
Slovak 
Rep Slovenia
 Real exchange rate based on consumer prices         
1994-2005 -40.1 -51.8 -33.8 -42.5 -60.2 -35.1 -45.9 -17.9 
2000-2005 -18.2 -8.6 -22.6 13.5 -2.6 -4.2 -25.7 -2.9 
 Real exchange rate based on producer prices         
1994-2005 -32.4 -38.7 -20.1 -25.6 -57.2 -23.6 -35.3 -3.4 
2000-2005 -16.1 0.6 -7.8 14.0 -6.5 -1.7 -20.4 2.8 
 Nominal exchange rate to euro           
1994-2005 -12.4 1.6 97.4 4.8 -27.0 50.1 1.5 56.8 
2000-2005 -15.9 0.0 -5.1 24.4 -6.6 1.3 -9.3 16.0 
φbased on CPI and PPI 
The sizeable real appreciation in some countries may signal deteriorating 
competitiveness and might need to be corrected by real depreciation later. 
However, because of the catch up growth process, a part of the real 
appreciation of the EU-8 exchange rates can be an equilibrium phenomenon 
and may not require adjustment. As is presented in more detail in the 
background paper by Lommatzsch and Wozniak, the price levels in the new 
member states are significantly lower than in the euro area. In some countries, 
the price levels amount to close to 50% of the euro area level. It is widely held 
that the low price levels are related to the lower income levels and that the 
process of catch up growth will entail price level convergence.  
 
The price level differences and the price level convergence process are most 
often interpreted along the lines of the Balassa-Samuelson model (Balassa 
1964, Samuelson 1964) which reveals why price levels of poorer countries tend 
to be lower than price levels of countries with higher income. The economy is 
divided into a sector producing internationally traded goods and a sector with 
non-traded goods. The latter mainly comprises labour intensive services that 
are immediately consumed. The traded goods sector charges prices in 
accordance with PPP, and pays wages in accordance with its productivity. 
Hence countries with high productivity in the traded goods sector have higher 
wages, and countries with low productivity have lower wages. If these wages 
have to be paid throughout the entire economy because of wage equalisation, 
and wage costs are the main determinant of prices, and services will be cheaper 
in the less productive country. Dynamically, catching up in productivity levels 
in the traded goods sector implies catching up in the prices of services and 
hence price level convergence.  
 
In the Balassa-Samuelson model, differences in price levels and the price level 
convergence are based on service prices only. Indeed, in the new member 
states the price levels of services are particularly low (cf. Figure 3.1), but lower 
price levels are found also in goods, and most importantly in non-durable 
consumer goods. Consequently, other causes of the deviation in price levels 
have also to be considered. Differences in the quality and variety of the 
representative goods and services, as well as possible differences in the 
reputation of domestic and foreign goods might impact on the price level (cf. 
the background paper by Lommatzsch and Wozniak). An improvement in the 
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quality and reputation of goods produced in the economies catching up may 
even lead to a trend appreciation of the producer prices deflated real exchange 
rate (see also Égert et al. 2005). Furthermore, the former planned economies 
started the transition process with a distorted system of relative prices. Most 
prices have been freed rather quickly, however, some socially sensitive prices 
have only been liberalised steadily, some of which are still in the process of 
adjustment. The variety and quality of services increases during the process of 
catching up, this is perhaps most pronounced in the financial market, the real 
estate market and in business services. At the same time, a number of public 
services requiring networks and capital were of rather poor quality during the 
planned period. Telecommunications, transport (railways, roads) and the 
transport equipment, energy and water supply all require upgrading of the 
capital stock and the networks. This should raise the quality of these services, 
and may also affect their price, both within the economy and their relative price 
to the euro area. This may also indirectly bear on the prices in the rest of the 
economy, if these services constitute intermediate products or allow the 
economy to increase the range and quality of other supplied products. 
 
Figure 3.1: Relative price levels of GDP, total goods and total services, 2004 
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Therefore, based on a number of channels, the growth process is connected 
with a rising price level defined as the average price of the goods and services 
produced and consumed in the economy. However, it has to be stressed that 
this need neither be fully reflected in the inflation rates of the countries 
catching up, nor in the relative price level data published by the 
Eurostat/OECD project on price level comparisons. Whereas relative price 
levels are calculated based on the comparison of prices of (ideally) identical or at 
least very similar products that allow comparison, the average price level of an 
economy will be determined by the variety and quality of the goods produced 
and consumed. The main characteristic of the transition and catching up 
growth process, i.e. steady structural change towards a higher quality and 
higher variety of the products, cannot be (by definition) adequately reflected in 
the relative price level and its changes. In sum, price level convergence (defined 
over the price level of a representative basket of goods and services in an 
economy) will occur through, first, a change in the structure of the 
representative goods and services, second an increase in the quality and variety 
of the goods and services and, third, higher prices of services in line with the 
BS model and increases in regulated prices. The latter may have additional 
effects on the entire price level if they are intermediate goods. Only the third 
channel should be reflected in higher inflation rates (and a sustainable real 
appreciation) vis-à-vis the more developed countries on a systematic basis. 
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However, insufficient adjustment for quality improvements will have a similar 
effect and may moreover also concern the industrial goods prices.  
 
At the same time, not all of the real appreciation needs to be an equilibrium 
phenomenon related to the process of catching up. Other factors such as 
inflation due to wage growth, higher inflation expectations, credit growth and 
capital inflows may also affect the inflation rate. Therefore, the question of 
how much of the real appreciation is equilibrium and how much is not, is a 
very complicated issue. Many investigations have already been made to 
establish the size of the equilibrium real appreciation, and the results are not 
always conclusive (for an overview of studies cf. Égert et al 2005). The 
background paper of Fic, Barrell and Holland contains an estimation of the 
equilibrium exchange rate based on the FEER model. The real exchange rate is 
estimated from the perspective of the trade balance and external debt 
sustainability. The introduction of a debt target allows the FEER model to be 
extended from the medium to the long run. Imports depend on the domestic 
income growth and the price competitiveness, whereas exports depend on 
foreign income growth and price competitiveness. In addition, the estimations 
include a factor reflecting the upgrading of the supply sides in the new member 
states, FDI inflow. The estimations of Fic et al. indicate that the observed real 
appreciation of the currencies can indeed be traced back to the catching up 
growth and might consequently be sustainable. Table 3.6 shows the estimated 
equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate in 2005. However, the speed 
of equilibrium appreciation has substantially declined since the early years of 
the transition; and has been on average more pronounced in the Baltic States 
than in the Central European countries. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Estimated Equilibrium Appreciation of the Real Exchange Rate in 2005 
  Czech Rep Estonia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Poland Slovenia Slovak Rep
2005 1.8 2.0 1.6 3.6 1.8 1.6 1.2 4.1 
 
In the next few years, the central European countries could expect a further 
real appreciation of 1-2% per annum., and the Baltic states of 2-3% p.a. Lower 
gains in non-price competitiveness and growing income payments (profits, 
dividends, interest) due to the accumulated foreign debt may limit the real 
appreciation in the more distanced future.  
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS 
Another salient feature of most new member states is current account deficits. 
These are quite large in some countries (see Table 3.7 in the appendix). As in 
the case of the real appreciations, this might indicate unsustainable imbalances 
but can also be related to the catching up growth process.  
 
The intertemporal model of the current account (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1994) explains why countries in the catching up process run external deficits. 
In this model the current account is viewed as the result of savings decisions of 
intertemporally maximising consumers on the one hand and high investment 
to realise the growth potential on the other hand. Because of unrestricted 
capital flows, a country can make debts, implying the following budget 
constraint of the economy: 
 
1( )t t t t t tY C G I rB B +− − − − =  
 
Consumers will maximise lifetime utility by choosing a smooth path of 
consumption based on the expected lifetime income and the interest rate. With 
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an expected higher income in the future, the economy will run current deficits 
in the early years and repay the debt later. According to the model a country 
can run current account deficits as long as the (expected) future income is large 
enough (cf. e.g. Lipschitz et al. 2002 for estimates of how large current account 
deficits might become in the former transition economies). The equilibrium 
condition of such process only requires that the debt cannot grow forever, i.e. 
it has to converge to zero in the limit. 
 
Yet, the intertemporal model of the current account focuses on the higher 
welfare gains due to the consumption smoothing. It neither considers the role 
of the financial system in determining and monitoring efficient investment 
opportunities, nor whether the use of foreign savings to finance the growth 
may create additional problems. In reality there is no size of the current 
account deficit that is safe given a high growth potential. First, the smooth 
development of a country running current account deficits critically hinges on 
that higher output and income indeed materialises, such that the debt can be 
serviced and repaid without major demand adjustment. In the absence of 
nominal exchange rate flexibility, this could require real wage and price 
adjustment and might come at an output and employment cost. Second, the 
capital flows related to the current account imbalances create problems of their 
own. Ample literature exists on the vulnerability of countries running current 
account deficits. Current account imbalances always imply the risk that a 
country cannot attract sufficient financing to sustain its level of excess demand 
and hence, has to suddenly correct its demand level. Whereas this can be 
triggered by an unsustainable level of domestic demand, a similar consequence 
will follow if investors’ sentiments suddenly change due to perceived or real 
problems in the domestic economy or if the international interest rate 
unexpectedly shifts. Large current account deficits are also a warning signal of 
currency crisis (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart 1996). In particular, when 
combined with other vulnerabilities such as real appreciation, fiscal deficits (i.e. 
“twin deficits”), weaknesses in the banking system, short-term financing of the 
current account deficit or inconsistent policies, emerging countries are exposed 
to currency speculation and currency crisis (cf. Kaminsky 2003; and Roubini 
and Wachtel 1998 for an application to transition economies).  
 
For the new member states, membership of the euro area will reduce the risks 
related to sudden reversals of capital and the consequences thereof on the 
currency and the nominal exchange rate. Risk premia will be reduced. As a 
result, capital inflows might even increase after the introduction of the euro. 
However what it does not change is the obligation to service and repay the 
debt; or – as in the case of FDI – to transfer profits. In fact, the indebtedness 
of the new member states may increase as domestic savings might be depressed 
due to the lower interest rate and the better access to foreign financing. The 
capital flows may become less determined by currency related considerations, 
and will be oriented only by the risk of the investments and future growth. As 
elaborated in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), the membership in the euro area 
has significantly contributed to the widening current accounts in Portugal and 
Greece and the sustained imbalances between demand and supply. However, 
the example of Portugal also shows that the high indebtedness of the 
households can require substantial adjustment later, which comes at the cost of 
low income growth and higher unemployment rates (cf. Blanchard 2006). 
Therefore, for a smooth process of catching up it is of utmost importance that 
the investment opportunities are carefully chosen and controlled in order to 
realise the expected growth and higher income.   
 
In the EU-8, all countries with the exception of Slovenia, either run high 
current account deficits or have at some point during the past ten years run 
high deficits. The highest deficits are recorded in the Baltic states with 
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magnitudes of close to or even exceeding 10% of GDP (cf. Table 3.7 in the 
appendix). Rather large deficits have been recorded also in Hungary with 8% 
of GDP. Table 3.7 also shows that FDI have been an important source for 
financing the current account deficits. Consequently, income payments have 
become quite sizeable in some countries (Czech Republic, Estonia; in Hungary 
income payments were large since the outset of the transition also due to the 
high debt inherited from the planned system). So far, some income payments 
are reinvested in these economies and hence have not directly affected the 
foreign exchange market. For the potential adjustment processes within the 
enlarged euro area it might be important to note that in some countries 
improvements of the trade balance have occurred despite real appreciation of 
the currency (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary). This underlines the 
possible influence of supply side upgrading and growing non-price 
competitiveness on the trade performance. On the other hand, the worsening 
of the trade and current account in Latvia during the recent years has occurred 
against the background of nominal (effective) depreciation of the currency. 
Estimations about whether or not the size of the current account deficits of the 
new member states are in line with their expected growth and the size of the 
foreign debt were made e.g. by Zanghieri (2004) and Bussiere et al. (2004). The 
low level of foreign debt and the fact that FDI still have an important share in 
the financing of the deficits support the sustainability of the current accounts. 
Nevertheless, these estimations suggest that the current account deficits in 
Estonia and Latvia may have become excessive in recent years. Of course, it is 
rather difficult to establish which size of the current account deficit is 
sustainable and which is not. Nonetheless, large current account deficits create 
vulnerabilities in any case. Although the new member states will gain 
immensely from the fact that in the monetary union a currency crisis becomes 
rather unlikely8, changes in investors’ sentiments can nevertheless occur and 
might require major adjustments in the domestic demand. Likewise, the 
investments must prove sufficiently efficient to allow a repayment of the debt 
without costly demand adjustment. This holds all the more as already the 
current accounts of quite a few new member states are, to a growing extent, 
determined by the income payments.  
STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
Closely related to the question of sustainable current accounts is the issue of 
financial stability during the growth process and the impact of the financial 
market integration on the new member states’ domestic demand and financial 
stability. On the one hand, the better access to financing investment will reduce 
the costs of the catching up growth. On the other, the further reduction of the 
interest rates may carry risks that threaten macroeconomic and financial 
 
8 Begg et al. (2003) as point this out. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) also stresses that the 
current account deficits of the new member states are linked to the catching up growth process. 
In particular the FDI into technology- intensive sectors are supposed to improve the capacity of 
the recipient country to service the debt. However, the Bundesbank neglects the benefits of euro 
area membership for a more stable financing of the current account deficits. Instead it suggests 
keeping the exchange rate as a tool for possible adjustment. Above all, it states that “joining the 
euro area too early would make it difficult to set an adequate conversion rate.” These arguments 
are misleading in the sense that, first, the setting of the adequate conversion rate is difficult in 
any circumstances. Second, in particular the three Baltic states do not have the option of a 
nominal exchange rate adjustment without great damage to their credibility. Third, all new 
member states face capital inflows due to return differentials irrespective of whether or not they 
are members of the euro area. Membership of the EU largely restricts capital controls. 
Therefore, the protection against sudden changes in capital flows may be an additional benefit 
of the euro adoption, whereas the need to adjust to shocks is common to both options. 
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stability and the success of the growth process, as is suggested e.g. by Kröger 
and Redonnet (2001).  
 
The financial system is crucial for the growth process and for convergence in 
income levels (cf. Levine 1996). The financial system has to efficiently mobilise 
savings, choose and control the investment projects and pool risks; and thereby 
contribute to growth. However, similar to the risks with external imbalances 
described in the previous section, particular problems arise from the 
uncertainty that surrounds investment projects and the growth potential. The 
financial system will extend credit based on its assessment of future growth 
and risk tolerance on the one hand and access to reserve assets and the interest 
rate on the other. This can affect the macroeconomic stability and the 
smoothness of the growth process. If banks misjudge the growth potential or 
do not monitor the creditors sufficiently, losses may follow that eventually 
might end up in bank failures9. The stability of the financial system therefore 
depends on the ability of the banks and other financial institutions to make 
competent judgements on the profitability of projects, to monitor the 
borrowers and to care for sufficient liquidity and reserves for risk provision.  
 
During phases of very fast growth, problems may be aggravated. Based on an 
optimistic assessment of the future and the debt repayment ability, an 
insufficient capacity to closely monitor all investment projects and rising asset 
prices including those of real estate, banks may contribute to lending booms 
that might become unsustainable. Boom-bust cycles are modelled in the 
literature of the “financial accelerator” (cf. e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 
Bernanke et al. 1998). According to these models, lending is accelerated during 
a phase of high growth because asset prices rise, which raises the net worth of 
the borrowers. Further lending can thus be justified, which amplifies the credit 
and asset price growth. If the bubble bursts, the opposite may occur. In any 
case, overexpansion of credits and the financial system will go with similar 
swings in the real economy implying periods of growth above and below GDP 
potential and the natural employment rate.  
 
In the new member states, the potential for credit growth and financial 
deepening is substantial. The financial systems were underdeveloped during the 
early years of the transition. Bad loans and bank failures plagued some 
countries for a number of years with heavy costs for the state budget. 
According to indicators such as credit to GDP or debt to GDP, these 
economies are still characterised by a low degree of financial intermediation 
(see the background paper of Bartosz Pawlowski). Recently however, credits 
have started to grow substantially on account of the favourable growth 
prospects, a stable macroeconomic environment including declining interest 
rates and the more aggressive lending by banks. Credit growth has exceeded 40 
per cent per annum in the Baltic states, but has substantial also been in 
Hungary and Slovenia. At the same time, housing prices and credits in foreign 
currency have moved up markedly. Owing to the euro adoption, this expansion 
is likely to intensify in the coming years. The lower interest rates may 
discourage domestic saving, whereas demand for credit will grow further thus 
heightening the risk of overstretching the financial system. It will have to make 
even more use of foreign financing and thus increase vulnerability to sudden 
changes in the exchange rate or international financing conditions. 
 
 
9 The banking crisis can even go together with currency crises if the banks have lent money in 
foreign currency and cannot repay or service the credits, triggering capital outflow (“twin crises”) 
(Kaminsky and Reinhard 1996). 
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However, the credit growth in the new member states is not unprecedented 
(cf. the background papers of Fitz Gerald on the experience of Ireland and 
Spain in the Euro Area, and of Pawlowski). Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland (EU-4) experienced similar phases of credit expansion during their 
approaching euro adoption. The credit boom in the new member states may 
prove even less pronounced because the convergence in interest rates will 
imply a smaller decline in the rates – if any at all (see Table 3.8). This is further 
supported by the fact that already credits in foreign currency (and among them 
mainly in euro) make up a significant share of the total credits owing to the 
lower interest rate and in some cases also expectations of nominally 
appreciating exchange rates. Experience of the EU-4 also suggests that the 
financial systems could cope well with the credit expansion before the euro 
adoption, even in spite of a widely differing development of the real economy 
after the introduction of the euro. 
 
Table 3.7: Interest Rates in the NMS and the EU-4            
 Eu-12 Czech Rep Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Siovenia Slovak R  Germ Gr Spain Irl Portu
10 year government bond 
yields                
2001 5.0 6.3 10.2 7.6 7.6 8.2 7.9 6.2 10.7  8.0 1993 6.5 23.3 10.2 7.7 11.2
2003 4.2 4.1 5.2 4.7 4.9 5.3 6.8 5.0 5.8 6.4 5.0 1995 6.9 17.0 11.3 8.3 11.5
2005 3.4 3.5 4.0 5.2 3.9 3.7 6.6 4.6 5.2 3.8 3.5 1997 5.6 9.9 6.4 6.3 6.4
 
Difference to euro 
area           
Difference to 
Germany 
2001  1.3 5.1 2.6 2.5 3.1 2.9 1.2 5.7 -5.0 3.0 1993  16.8 3.7 1.2 4.7
2003  0.0 1.1 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.7 0.9 1.6 2.2 0.8 1995  10.2 4.4 1.4 4.6
2005  0.1 0.6 1.7 0.5 0.3 3.2 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.1 1997  4.3 0.8 0.7 0.7
             
3 month money 
market            
2001 4.3 5.2 5.3 5.9 6.9 5.9 10.9 4.9 16.1 10.9 7.8 1993 7.2 23.5 11.7 9.3 13.3
2003 2.3 2.3 2.9 3.9 3.8 2.8 8.5 3.3 5.7 6.8 6.2 1995 4.5 16.4 9.4 6.3 9.8
2005 2.2 2.0 2.4 4.3 3.1 2.4 6.7 3.2 5.3 4.0 2.9 1997 3.3 12.8 5.4 6.1 5.7
 
Difference to euro 
area           
Difference to 
Germany 
2001  0.9 1.1 1.7 2.6 1.7 6.6 0.7 11.8 6.6 3.5 1993  16.2 4.5 2.0 6.0
2003  -0.1 0.6 1.6 1.5 0.5 6.2 1.0 3.3 4.4 3.8 1995  11.9 4.9 1.8 5.3
2005  -0.2 0.2 2.1 0.9 0.2 4.5 1.0 3.1 1.8 0.7 1997  9.5 2.1 2.8 2.4
 
 
The credit expansion can be viewed as an equilibrium phenomenon in the 
sense that it corrects the very low credit to GDP ratios to levels observed in 
countries of a similar development stage. Although testing such links is 
particularly complicated, the studies of Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) and Égert et al 
(2006) suggest that the adjustment of the credit to GDP ratio can indeed 
explain part of the lending boom. Furthermore, in some new member states, 
investment makes up a similarly high share in GDP as in the euro area (see 
Figure 3.2); the catching up growth might justify higher investment rates. 
Therefore, these studies suggest that credit expansion may be a sustainable 
event in the catching up growth process. 
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Figure 3.2: Investment in fixed capital as share of nominal GDP; average 
annual real growth rate of investment in fixed capital (averages of 
2000-2005) 
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Also the banks’ profitability and other stability indicators10 develop favourably. 
Banks’ profitability benefited from the credit expansion due to growing income 
from interest. In addition, in most new member states foreign owned banks 
dominate the financial systems. This not only promotes the banks’ know-how 
in credit monitoring, but also reduces the costs of refinancing because of their 
higher rating.  
 
Nevertheless, serious risks are related to the credit expansions in the new 
member states, both during the preparation phase and when being in the euro 
area. Credit growth has been particularly pronounced in mortgages. Due to the 
very low level of residential as well as mortgage debt in the new member states, 
there is still huge potential for expansion, if the ratios observed in the euro area 
are taken as a reference. Problems for financial stability might then arise from 
the house prices. The large increases in housing prices along with the credit 
expansion have already shown that risks of acceleration are clearly present in 
some new member states. Sudden changes in the housing prices may lead to 
large adjustment needs in the banks’ assets. A problem during the preparation 
phase to euro area membership stems from the fact that the mortgage credits 
are often raised in foreign currency due to their lower costs. On the one hand, 
the steady real (and sometimes also nominal) appreciation has so far favoured 
timely servicing of the credits in foreign currency. On the other hand it greatly 
increases the vulnerabilities of banks to changes in the nominal exchange rate. 
This is of particular importance for countries with a flexible exchange rate and 
a large share of loans in foreign currency, such as Poland and Hungary. 
Exchange rate stability or at least avoiding major depreciation thus seems 
crucial for maintaining financial stability in the preparation phase to euro area 
membership. 
 
High foreign ownership in the new member states might reduce the risk of 
bank failures because of the high share of credits granted in foreign currency. 
However, the issue then arises as to who is responsible for the regulation of 
these banks and who will be responsible for dealing with any financial crisis 
that will arise. In the event of a financial crisis in one of the new member 
states, provided that the size of the losses sustained by individual foreign banks 
in the new member states is small relative to their total assets, the individual 
 
10 Refer to background paper of Bartosz Pawlowski. 
  
 
62 CONVERGENCE AND INTEGRATION OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES TO THE EURO AREA    
foreign banks should be able to ride out the problem. However, if the losses 
are large and, in particular, if the crisis arises from a shock to the EU economy 
rather than to a local economy in a new member states, then the problem could 
be difficult to deal with. The regulatory authorities in the new member states 
may well argue that the supervision of foreign banks is the responsibility of the 
regulators in the banks’ home countries. As a result, they could be slow to act 
to deal with a crisis. For example, the Estonian banking system is largely 
owned by Scandinavian banks. The Estonian authorities could well argue that a 
collapse in the Estonian financial system was the responsibility of the 
Scandinavian authorities. However, the Governor of the Swedish Central Bank 
in discussing this potential problem at a conference in Brussels in Spring 2004, 
indicated that many of the banks operating in the Baltic countries were truly 
Scandinavian banks and that the division of responsibility for their regulation 
between the Central Banks of the Scandinavian countries was also not clear. 
The lack of clarity about regulatory responsibility raises a number of dangers: 
Firstly, regulation may be weaker than would be the case for banks operating in 
their home country. Secondly, in the event of an impending crisis, there could 
be a slow bicycle race by regulatory authorities across the EU as they argue 
about responsibility, raising the risk that a local crisis could affect the stability 
of the wider EU financial system. 
 
In sum, the new member states can indeed expect that euro area membership 
will further push credit growth and hence affect macroeconomic and financial 
stability. However, euro area membership will imply that currency and 
exchange rate risks (as regards credits in euro) will be eliminated. Because of 
the already widespread debt in euro the countries will benefit in that 
vulnerabilities to currency depreciation will diminish and financial stability 
promoted. All risks for the financial system stemming from the asset prices as 
collateral or of the general capacity of the banking system to cope with the 
catching up related financial deepening and credit growth will of course remain. 
In addition, to stabilise demand, fiscal policy will be main tool available in the 
euro area. These include tax measures and requirements of collateral (cf. 
background paper from Fitz Gerald). However, it has to be borne in mind that 
as these countries are small open economies with liberalised capital flows, for 
which the exchange rate is of major importance, the interest rate is not an 
independent variable in any case. Given their growth potential and the 
expected higher real returns, capital inflows and credit growth are rather likely 
irrespective of whether or not they are members of the monetary union (cf. 
Lipschitz et al. 2002). Membership of monetary union largely reduces the risk 
of currency crises stemming from the current account deficits, and this might 
be a more important consequence for the new member states than the loss of 
the potentially stabilising instrument of a nominal exchange rate and the 
interest rate. For most of the new member states the latter have not been easily 
available anyway. The issue of finding the most efficient use of capital and the 
implications of capital inflows and credit growth for macroeconomic and 
financial stability are common to both options, however.  
FISCAL CHALLENGES 
As was already indicated in the preceding sections, fiscal policy is the remaining 
tool for demand stabilisation in a monetary union. The requirement of a 
balanced budget on average during the business cycle fixed in the Stability and 
Growth Pact was intended to allow a flexible use of fiscal policy during the 
business cycle and to counteract the effect of shocks. However, fiscal policy 
dilemmas can arise in a case when fiscal deficits already exist and consolidation 
could be either achieved by lowering expenditure or stimulating growth.  
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As regards fiscal policy, the new member states can be broadly divided into 
two categories: four countries are running rather small budget deficits, whereas 
the other six have been included in the Excessive Deficit Procedure right after 
entering the EU (cf. Table 3.9). A favourable budgetary situation prevails in the 
three Baltic states (with hard pegs) and in Slovenia, which has also tightly 
managed the exchange rate. Large deficits connected with a debt exceeding the 
60% determined in the Maastricht Treaty are present in only two cases (Cyprus 
and Malta). The new member states differ not only in the size of the deficit, 
but also in the size of the overall government (expenditures as % of GDP) and 
of the transfers and benefits. Generally the countries with the higher deficits 
have the larger share of expenditures in per cent of GDP in transfers and also 
subsidies (cf. Table 3.3 in the background paper by Antczak, Markiewicz and 
Siwinska). In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, interest payments exceed or are 
close to 3% of GDP.  
 
Table 3.9: Fiscal Indicators 
 
Net lending 
(+) /net 
borrowing 
(-) 
Total gen gov 
expend 
Total 
gen 
gov rev
Gen gov 
consolidated 
gross debt 
Net lending 
(+) /net 
borrowing (-)
Total gen gov 
expend 
Total gen 
gov rev 
Gen gov 
consolidated 
gross debt 
 eurozone12        
2002a00 -2.5 47.7 45.2 69.2     
2003a00 -3.0 48.3 45.3 70.4     
2004a00 -2.7 47.6 44.8 70.8     
 Czech R   Hungary    
2002a00 -6.8 46.9 40.2 29.8 -8.4 52.1 43.6 55.5 
2003a00 -12.4 53.5 41.0 36.8 -6.4 49.8 43.4 57.4 
2004a00 -3.0 44.3 41.4 36.8 -5.4 49.7 44.4 57.4 
 Estonia   Malta    
2002a00 1.0 36.8 37.8 5.8 -5.7 45.5 39.8 63.2 
2003a00 2.4 36.7 39.1 6.0 -10.4 50.3 39.9 72.8 
2004a00 1.5 36.4 37.9 5.5 -5.1 48.8 43.7 75.9 
 Cyprus   Poland    
2002a00 -4.5 40.6 36.1 65.2 -3.3 45.6 42.3 41.2 
2003a00 -6.3 45.4 39.1 69.8 -4.8 45.8 41.0 45.3 
2004a00 -4.1 44.1 39.9 72.0 -3.9 44.8 40.9 43.6 
 Latvia   Slovenia    
2002a00 -2.3 36.1 33.8 14.2 -2.6 48.0 45.4 29.8 
2003a00 -1.2 35.0 33.8 14.6 -2.7 47.9 45.2 29.4 
2004a00 -0.9 35.8 34.9 14.7 -2.0 47.4 45.4 29.8 
 Lithuania   Slovakia    
2002a00 -1.4 34.2 32.8 22.4 -7.8 43.8 36.1 43.7 
2003a00 -1.2 33.1 31.9 21.4 -3.8 39.7 35.9 43.1 
2004a00 -1.4 33.2 31.8 19.6 -3.2 40.6 37.4 42.5 
 
 
Thus, in some cases large budget deficits add to the vulnerabilities of the new 
member states, in particular as long as they are outside of the euro area. As was 
already indicated in the previous section, the countries can be considered 
emerging markets with low financial depth, and the government debt may 
include also liabilities in foreign currency. Large budget deficits are among the 
causes of currency crisis and exchange rate turmoil in small open emerging 
economies. Independently of that, budget consolidation is required in the 
Maastricht criteria on nominal convergence.  
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However, the consolidation process might be complicated by the fact that a 
number of budgetary liabilities are legacies of the transition process (e.g. costs 
of cleaning up of banks balance sheets in the Czech Republic or high debt 
accumulated already in the planned era in Hungary) and that the catching up 
growth process and the membership in the EU entails additional costs for the 
budgets11. The background paper by Antczak, Markiewicz and Siwinska studies 
this aspect in more detail. According to the authors, the additional fiscal 
pressures from the EU accession can amount up to 2.6% of GDP. These are 
related to the membership fees, co-financing of EU projects, environmental 
and infrastructure requirements. While in general these are beneficial to the 
growth process, they may create additional strains for the state budget. The 
same applies to the impact of pension reforms. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
have introduced a second, fully funded mandatory pillar of the pension system, 
which may lead to lower fiscal expenditures and receipts in the longer run, but 
imply short to medium-term costs. In the background paper of Catherine 
Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak it is argued that the rules of the SGP may not be 
entirely adequate for the new member states. Because of the higher investment 
needs, a Golden rule might fit countries catching up better and help avoid 
harming growth by budget restrictions. The rather low debts and small size of 
the new member states make it unlikely that risks for the euro area are raised. 
All in all, the authors suggest  reforming fiscal rules in EMU so as to be in 
direct reference to the macroeconomic equilibrium of the euro area. 
LABOUR MARKET 
The functioning of the labour market will be crucial for the abilities of the new 
member states of the euro area to adjust to shocks but also to maintain 
competitiveness. Adjustments after shocks and during changing demand and 
supply conditions will require adjustments in the real wage and demand 
quantities. The efficient functioning of the labour market is therefore of utmost 
importance in the monetary union.  
In the new member states, the labour markets in some countries are 
characterised by a lower employment ratio (participation ratio), and a 
significantly higher unemployment rate than in the euro area (cf. Table 3.10). 
Only very recently have some indicators started to point towards a higher 
labour use; the higher growth has so far been based primarily on productivity 
growth. However, second jobs and working in the informal sector is still rather 
widespread. The high unemployment rates coupled with substantial long-term 
unemployment could be taken as evidence that the labour markets in the NMS 
are ill-suited for adjustment without nominal exchange rate flexibility. 
 
Table 3.10: NMS and Euro Area: Unemployment and Participation Rates 
 Eu-12 Czech Rep Estonia Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Hungary Malta Poland Slovenia Slovak Rep 
Unemployment 
rate, 2005           
8.6 8.0 7.8 6.1 9.0 8.2 7.1 8.0 17.8 6.3 16.4 
Participation rate, age 15-64, 
2004          
69 70 70 73 70 69 61 58 64 70 70 
           
 
 
Labour market flexibility can be assessed with reference to the labour market 
institutions such as the wage determination process, the benefit system and 
active labour market policies. As in the euro area, the wage determination 
 
11 although not necessarily for the entire economies 
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process (as regards central or decentralised bargaining) is rather diverse. 
However, wage bargaining takes place more often at the firm level (cf. 
Ederveeen and Thissen 2004). The only exception is Slovenia where wages are 
set by centralised bargaining. Slovenia also has a rather long history of wage 
indexation, which was amended by forward-looking clauses only recently. 
Ederveen and Thissen, similar to Boeri (2005) find that based on a number of 
indicators, the new member states could be considered less rigid than the 
labour markets in the euro area. For instance, replacement rates in 
unemployment benefits are stricter and paid for a shorter duration. Also based 
on job turnover and reallocation of workers, the new member states do not 
seem to have rigid labour markets (Boeri 2005). Similar conclusions are arrived 
at by von Hagen and Traistaru (2005) who test the real wage responsiveness to 
unemployment rates in the new member states. However, major problems are 
regional mismatches and low regional labour mobility also because of 
insufficiently developed housing markets. 
 
In their background paper, Radziwill and Walewski study nominal wage 
flexibility as an adjustment mechanism. It is first recalled that the adjustment is 
required in the real unit labour costs and not necessarily in the nominal wage 
because wage costs have to be put into perspective with the productivity level. 
Their research indicates that downward nominal wage flexibility in the new 
member states is rather limited, but they can detect real unit labour costs 
flexibility. In the past ten years the adjustment of the real unit labour costs has 
occurred through moderation of real wage growth and productivity 
improvements that were not reflected in real wage growth. The authors 
conclude that as long as the new member states can expect high productivity 
growth, this will increase their ability to adjust the real wage despite nominal 
downward rigidity.  
 
 3.4 Aspects of 
the preparation 
phase THE NOMINAL CONVERGENCE CRITERIA 
The most closely monitored precondition of euro area membership is the 
meeting of nominal convergence criteria. Specifically, the ECB and the 
European Commission are required to report to the Council of the European 
Union at least once every two years on the progress made by the member 
states with derogation from euro area membership (ECB 2004, European 
Commission 2004). The nominal convergence criteria require that the inflation 
rate and the long-term interest rate of the applicant do not exceed the 
respective average values of the three member states of the EU with the lowest 
inflation rate by more than 1.5% and 2%, respectively; that the budget deficit 
does not exceed 3% of GDP and government debt is lower then 60% of GDP. 
The exchange rate has to be fixed within the ERM-II and remain stable for two 
years. Literally, the exchange rates have to be kept in the “normal fluctuation 
margins provided by the exchange rate mechanism”. The current bands of the 
ERM-II are +/- 15%, but other interpretations also exist. The European 
Commission suggested that bands of +/-2.25% may also be relevant for the 
assessment of the exchange rate stability (Convergence report 2000, Annex D).  
 
In his background paper, Szczurek explores the implications of the 
convergence criteria and their interpretation for the preparation process. In 
particular, trend inflation rates related to the catching up growth process might 
be higher in the new member states. The convergence criterion might be met 
only with temporary measures that reduce growth and/or inflation or a 
nominal appreciation. Flexibility of the nominal exchange rate might therefore 
require fluctuation beyond the 2.25% bands. By contrast, inflation targets on 
the part of the new member states’ central banks of 2.5% +/- 1% (Poland) and 
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3% (Hungary, Czech Republic) may in themselves create problems with 
meeting the inflation criterion.  
 
Indeed, the two countries with low inflation among the new member states, 
Lithuania and the Czech Republic, have experienced sustained phases of 
nominal (effective) appreciation12. Currency boards, in particular if the 
countries cannot benefit from a depreciation of the US dollar to the euro, do 
not allow for the possibility of using a nominal appreciation for containing the 
effect of the trend real appreciation on inflation. Temporary measures such as 
changes in the VAT, delays in the adjustment of regulated prices or short-term 
demand management may still be available for meeting the Maastricht criteria. 
However, in all likelihood this implies that inflation will pick up again once the 
countries have joined the euro area, which raises questions as to the intended 
effect of the nominal convergence requirement. 
 
The exchange rate criterion is particularly demanding not only because of the 
simultaneous need to meet the criteria of low inflation and a stable exchange 
rate. Szczurek highlights the problems that might arise for the countries that 
have so far run more flexible exchange rate strategies to cope with the capital 
flows. If the fixed exchange rates are not entirely credible, based either on 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies, an insufficient willingness to defend the 
peg, or vulnerabilities such as current account deficits and exposure of banks 
to exchange rate risk, speculative attacks on the currency may follow with 
adverse effects on growth and stability13. Such reasoning also led the Central 
European countries to choose more flexible exchange rate regimes in the later 
phase of the transition to protect their economies. Of the three countries that 
have not yet entered ERM-II, Hungary has a fixed exchange rate with a wide 
band, where the central parity was shifted downwards in early 2003 to reduce 
appreciating pressures. Interest rates have been used extensively for 
stabilisation of the exchange rate. The Czech Republic has a nominally flexible 
exchange rate, but the central bank has intervened on some occasions in the 
foreign exchange market and has set interest rates also with a view to stabilising 
the exchange rate. In Poland, the exchange rate has been floating without any 
intervention from the central bank since 2000. The re-fixing of the exchange 
rate will significantly change the monetary policy setting in Poland and has to 
be well prepared in order to be credible in the market. Szczurek explores in 
more detail how the fixing of the exchange rate can in such case induce 
movements in the exchange rate and speculative capital flows. As a result, the 
simultaneous meeting of the nominal convergence criteria and the smooth 
catching up growth process may be hampered by the need to stabilise the 
exchange rate.  
CHOICE OF PARITY 
The choice of the final parity has serious implications because an incorrectly 
chosen parity will require adjustment within the monetary union. Whereas an 
undervalued parity may add safety to the preparation process, it might cause 
overheating and higher inflation once the economy in question is a member of 
the euro area. By contrast, an overvalued parity may require a downward 
correction of the real exchange rate, which may come at the cost of output and 
employment. Given the fact that real appreciation is expected to continue in 
the new member states, and that the easier access to financing investment may 
add to the already vivid demand, an overvalued entry might stabilise demand in 
these economies. An overvalued entry would also decrease the credit burden in 
 
12 cf. background paper on price level convergence and inflation. 
13 Buiter (2004) calls the need to participate in the ERM-II a “purgatory” because of the explicit 
requirements for central banks to target more than one goal. 
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countries with high credits in foreign currency. This strategy would however 
imply even higher current account deficits in the early years of euro area 
membership; the numerous vulnerabilities of the new member might be further 
aggravated. An irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate at an overvalued level 
might lead to testing the adjustment mechanisms of the new member states at a 
very early stage of euro area participation. Nevertheless, the experience with 
the fixing of the exchange rates in 1998 and with the choice of the ERM-II 
parities of the new member states suggests that the final conversion rates are 
fixed to the market rates irrespective of whether or not these correspond to 
(inherently uncertain) equilibrium exchange rates. To assess the impact of 
misaligned entry rates on the performance of the countries in the euro area, the 
background paper of Fic, Barrell and Holland contains simulations of the 
adjustment after a misaligned entry to the euro area. Whereas in the Baltic 
states, a misaligned entry could be corrected rather quickly; in the Central 
European countries the full effect of the wrong parity might evaporate only 
after five years. 
FULFILMENT OF THE NOMINAL CONVERGENCE CRITERIA IN 
2005 
The nominal convergence performance will be assessed in summer 2006 based 
on the trends in the preceding two years and on the latest data. Table 3.11 
summarises how the new member states fulfilled the criteria on the inflation 
rate and the long-term interest rate in 2005 and on deficit and debt in 2004 (the 
latest available data)14.  
 
Table 3.10:  Nominal Convergence According to the Maastricht Criteria 
2005 fi se nl cz dk fr de cy uk at pt eu1
2 
ie pl 
HICP rate 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
10y GB 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 5.2 4.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 5.2 
Deficit (2004)    -3.0    -4.1      -3.9 
Debt (2004)    36.8    72.0      43.6 
               
 it si be mt It sk es gr hu lu ee lv EU EA 
HICP rate 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.1 6.9 2.5 2.9 
10y GB 3.6 3.8 3.4 4.6 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.6 6.6 3.4 4.0 3.9 5.4 5.4 
Deficit (2004)  -2.0  -5.1 -1.4 -3.2   -5.4  1.5 -0.9   
Debt (2004)  29.8  75.9 19.6 42.5   57.4  5.5 14.7   
 
 
 
A first step is to define the reference value. According to the Maastricht treaty, 
the inflation and interest rate criterion is defined in relation to the values of the 
three EU member states with the lowest inflation rate. It was later clarified that 
this requires that the rates are positive. Nevertheless, the inflation and interest 
rate criteria could, in principle, be fixed with reference to countries that are not 
members of the euro area and thus face different monetary conditions e.g. 
through their exchange rate. The definition relative to the countries with the 
lowest inflation rates in the EU was chosen in the 1990s because the monetary 
union did not exist. Now it is argued that the criterion based on the entire EU 
has to be kept due to “equal treatment” and that these provisions could not be 
easily changed. However, in 2000 (Convergence report 2000) adjustments to 
the exchange rate criterion were made because the euro existed and exchange 
rate stability need not be defined relative to the “median currency”. As a result, 
 
14 Very detailed comments on the fulfilment of the convergence criteria up to 2004 are 
contained in the Convergence reports of the ECB and the Commission, and in Backé et al. 
(2004). 
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an adjustment of the inflation criterion to the more consistent inflation rates of 
euro area member states may not be too difficult to motivate. 
 
In 2005, the reference value for the inflation criterion in the strict sense would 
be set by Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands and would amount to 2.5%. If 
countries of the euro area alone were used for the determination of the 
criterion, the critical value would amount to 2.9% principally due to Finland, 
the Netherlands and France. The reference value for the interest rate criterion 
amounts to 5.4% in both cases. 
 
Of the new member states, all countries except Cyprus and Malta fulfil the 
debt criterion; in addition the Baltic states, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic 
fulfilled the deficit criterion in 2004. Based on the data for 2005, the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Poland and Slovenia and Malta meet the inflation criterion in 
the strict sense, whereas Lithuania and Slovakia are below the limit determined 
by euro area member states. Turning to the three countries that aim at euro 
adoption in January 2007, Slovenia fulfils all four criteria. Lithuania misses the 
criterion of inflation in the strict sense, but is still within the limit set by the 
euro area member states. Estonia has recently recorded a significant pick-up in 
the inflation rate, which exceeds the required value quite substantially. The 
Commission has already indicated that they interpret both the rate of Lithuania 
and Estonia as too high15. However, the high inflation rates might be due to 
temporary effects of hikes in the oil price and in administered prices. The rate 
of core inflation amounted to 2% in Estonia and 1.2% in Lithuania in 2005. 
Latvia, which aims at euro adoption in 2008, currently records a particularly 
high inflation rate. Although this might owe to the high growth and possible 
overheating of the economy; the long period of nominal effective currency 
depreciation may also have contributed. 
Therefore, the figures suggest that at least one country aiming to adopt the 
euro in 2007 will fulfil the required preconditions. Uncertainties remain in 
relation to Estonia and Lithuania. 
 
3.5 Implications 
for the euro area INCREASED HETEROGENEITY 
 
The enlargement will also affect the euro area as a whole, although perhaps not 
primarily through the impact on the aggregate. First, as was stated earlier, GDP 
in current prices will increase by only 6%. The process of catch up growth will 
be a long-term process and the weight of the new member states in the euro 
area will e also change, but only at a moderate pace. On the basis of the growth 
rate in the new member states exceeding that in the old member states by 2-4% 
in real and nominal terms, calculation indicate that the share of the new 
member states in the enlarged euro area would increase by one percentage 
point over the next five years16. Second, despite the substantially higher growth 
in the new member states, the growth rate of the euro area will rise only 
slightly. In 2004 the growth of the EU-22 amounted to 2.3%, in the euro area 
it was 2%. Therefore, the effect on the dynamics of GDP growth will be rather 
minor (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Bloomberg, 1 February 2006 
16 It is assumed that all new member states enter the euro area in 2007. This is of course 
unlikely.  
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Figure 3.3: Seasonally adjusted GDP growth rates  
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Third, the average inflation rate of the euro area will increase but only 
moderately following enlargement. Assuming a euro area inflation rate of 2%, 
and a rate in the order of the equilibrium real appreciation determined in the 
background paper on real exchange rates (cf. page 50 of this report) in the new 
member states, the overall inflation rate may increase by 0.2 percentage points. 
As such this does not constitute a major issue as this may only reflect the 
catching up growth process of the new member states. On the other hand, the 
ECB targets an inflation rate of close to, but below, 2%, which it has failed to 
meet already in the current euro area in the past years. Therefore, the additional 
increase due to the new member states will in all likelihood remain small, 
however, the definition of price stability may have to be considered and 
marginally adjusted.  
 
Whereas the effect of the new member states on the aggregate development of 
the euro area will be rather limited, diversity in the euro area will most probably 
amplify. The GDP growth rates are and might remain more volatile that those 
of the euro area and of most of the old member states in the euro area. 
Volatility of growth rates has already been higher in the new member states 
because of their small size and hence less diverse economic structure (cf. 
Süppel 2003). The changed policy framework in the monetary union might 
contribute to even higher volatility in the future17. Much the same holds for the 
inflation rates. These may remain more volatile than in the old member states 
because of the higher share of food and energy in the consumer baskets of the 
new member states (cf. the background paper of Lommatzsch and Wozniak). 
In quite a few new member states core inflation defined as the overall index 
excluding food, energy, tobacco and alcohol currently only refers to half of the 
consumer basket.  
 
This will add to the already observed heterogeneity in the euro area, already 
subject to much debate18. The greatest worry concerns the fact that with 
diverging growth rates and inflation rates, monetary policy that targets the 
average may be inappropriate for some member states and thus impede stable 
 
17 Schadler et al. (2005) compare for the Czech Republic the volatility of growth and inflation 
within and outside the EMU based on simulations in the GEM model. They conclude that the 
differences might be small, as in the model calculations the output gap fluctuates by 2.1% 
around potential in the EMU and by 1.9% outside. Inflation rates – assuming an average rate of 
3% - range between 1.2 and 4.8% within the euro area and 1.3 and 4.7% outside. 
18 Recent examples are speeches of ECB representatives such as of Jose-Manuel Gonzales 
Paramo “Regional divergence in the euro area” on 19 September 2005, or of Lucas Papademos 
on the occasion of the ECB workshop “What effects is EMU having on the euro area and its 
member states” on 16 June 2005. 
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and steady growth. However, differences in growth and inflation rates can be 
natural phenomena within monetary union and need not in themselves create 
costs for the member states. First, differences prevail in the potential growth 
rates. Hence the growth rates may differ without any implications for the 
synchronicity in the cycles. Secondly, disparities in the inflation rate during the 
cycle may follow if the transmission mechanisms in the individual member 
states vary. Thirdly and perhaps more importantly, differences in the structure 
of the economies may imply varying continuous changes in the supply and 
demand conditions, which may give rise to heterogeneity in the inflation rates. 
Changes in the real exchange rate between regions of a monetary union are 
natural and cannot take place but through different inflation rates. Fourthly, 
some variation in the inflation and growth rates can also stem from dissimilar 
effects of a shock. A hike in oil prices or a swing in the external exchange rate 
may be adjusted to differently because of contrasting oil intensity and or oil 
dependency on the one hand or openness to trade with countries outside of 
the monetary union on the other. Fifthly, the impact of fiscal policies should 
not be underrated. In the euro area, the member states are responsible for 
fiscal policy except for the size of the deficit. The individual governments in 
the euro area may react differently to the cycle, which can give rise to diverging 
growth rates and cycles between the member states. In addition, fiscal 
consolidation programmes or any other kind of fiscal reform may entail tax 
increases or changes in other expenditure or revenue, which may affect both 
prices and the business cycle in the respective member state.  
 
These points illustrate that differences among the member states in growth 
rates and inflation rates can be manifold and quite natural. In the euro area 
they may in addition be also related to the fact that fiscal policy is neither 
harmonised nor coordinated. Many investigations have ascribed the differences 
in inflation rates in the euro area to structural factors (Honohan and Lane 
2003, ECB 2003). Nevertheless, whereas differences in the inflation rates as 
such are a natural phenomenon in the monetary union, persistent deviations 
may become detrimental to a steady growth process. It will affect the country 
recording the higher inflation rates as it may pile up imbalances, but may also 
harm other member states if this triggers a response of the central bank.  
 
Another aspect of enlarging the euro area is its effect on decision making in the 
ECB. More diverse inflation rates and growth rates might imply regional biases 
in the voting of the members of the Governing council. As a preparation for 
enlargement, voting rules have already been changed as suggested by the ECB 
in 2002 and adopted by the EU Council in 2003. It was decided at the time that 
when the euro area is enlarged to more than 16 members, the voting scheme 
would be changed so as to reduce the number of people entitled to vote. 
However, the determined structure of rotation and group forming could still 
lead to under-representation of the larger countries (Lommatzsch and Tober 
2003, Paczynski 2003). This might be particularly relevant if the countries with 
a smaller weight (e.g. the new member states) have higher inflation rates and 
might vote with a regional bias. A “small country bias” could emerge in the 
ECB’s policies. This is tested for by Paczynski in the background paper to this 
report in which he simulates the outcome of interest rate decisions if the 
regional representatives decide, in accordance with the cyclical stance and the 
inflation development in the region. Interest rate preferences are determined in 
accordance with the Taylor rule; the median of interest rate preferences is then 
interpreted as the outcome of the voting on the interest rate. The calculations 
are based on the past development, i.e. inflation rates and output in the euro 
area member states and the new member states are actual historical values for 
the period 1997-2005. This should imply higher divergences in the inflation 
rates and hence the voting then what actually is to be expected.  
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The results indicate that in the case where all members vote for their regionally 
preferred interest rate, large heterogeneity in the votes follows and the interest 
rate decision results in quite substantial deviations of the monetary policy 
outcome from its optimal path. The situation would not change unless the 
members of the Council assign more the 85% to area wide objectives. 
However, if only part of the people entitled to vote (e.g. the Board members) 
take the area-wide perspective, the problem of the interest rate decision being 
overly influenced by regional biases could be circumvented. These results are 
found for both the current voting system where every country has one vote, 
and for the new voting system with rotation and groups. In the latter the 
problem of regional biases might even be marginally aggravated. An important 
result is that these outcomes would apply for both the euro area of 12 
countries and the enlarged euro area of 25 countries.  
 
 3.6 Conclusions The enlargement of the European Union will be followed by the enlargement 
of the euro area quite soon. It will affect both the entrants and the euro area as 
a whole. For some of the new member states, the Baltic states in particular, 
who have already run strong exchange rate fixes, the changes in policy options 
may remain limited. Others however will have to fix the exchange rate and 
modify their policy settings significantly.  
 
The new member states stand to gain substantially from the adoption of the 
euro. Most of them have recorded real appreciation, strong credit expansion 
and current account deficits during the process of catch up growth, which has 
created vulnerability to changes in investors’ sentiments with regard to 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Being a member of the euro area will 
make financing of the current account deficit easier and less costly; 
furthermore it will eliminate the risk of a currency crisis following sharp 
reversals of capital flows. The lower interest rate in the euro area will promote 
catch up growth, while financial stability will be enhanced due to the 
elimination of exchange rate risk to the euro. This is particularly valuable for 
the countries where credits in euro already play a decisive role in the financial 
system. Consequently, as emerging markets the new member states can benefit 
immensely from euro area membership.  
 
Nevertheless, maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability during the 
growth process will remain a challenging task. A smooth process of catch up 
growth depends critically on higher growth and income being realised in a 
sustainable way, i.e. that the debt and credits can be serviced without major 
demand adjustment. The lower interest rate is likely to be beneficial for 
investment, but at the same time may challenge the capacity of the financial 
system to choose and monitor the most efficient investment projects. Changes 
in investors’ sentiments may still occur and affect asset prices or the availability 
of credit. Financial supervision is all the more important given that foreign 
owned banks dominate the financial market new member states and it may not 
be sufficiently clearly defined who regulates and supervises these banks. During 
the preparation process, fixing the exchange rate in ERM-II poses significant 
risks for the new member states that have previously had rather flexible 
regimes. An insufficiently credible fix may exacerbate the vulnerabilities due to 
current account deficits and a banking sector exposed to exchange rate risk.  
 
The enlargement of the euro area by at least one country, Slovenia, will occur 
in less than one year. Estonia and Lithuania however may miss the inflation 
convergence criterion. The Central European countries will most probably take 
longest for euro area entry, due to the requirements of fiscal criteria and a 
credible fixing of the exchange rate. As a result, the enlargement process of the 
euro area by the new member states might stretch over five years or more.  
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Because of the small size of the new member states, enlargement will only 
affect the euro area’s growth and inflation rates to a limited extent. Both rates 
will rise slightly without affecting the dynamics. Whereas the higher growth 
rate may not have any impact on the functioning of the euro area, the higher 
trend inflation rate might affect monetary policy. The impact will in all 
likelihood remain small, however the definition of price stability may have to 
be considered and marginally adjusted. European enlargement also makes it 
more crucial to rethink economic policy in Europe. If monetary policy cannot 
react to specific cases, it is necessary to reconsider the fiscal policy framework 
including the a priori set public finance targets. This might reduce the risk that 
not all countries benefit from the common monetary policy in the same way. 
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Appendix 3: 
 
Table 3.7: Interest Rates in the NMS and the EU-4            
 Eu-12 cz ee cy lv lt hu mt pl si sk  de gr es Irl pt 
10 year government bond 
yields                
2001 5.0 6.3 10.2 7.6 7.6 8.2 7.9 6.2 10.7 8.0 1993 6.5 23.3 10.2 7.7 11.2
2003 4.2 4.1 5.2 4.7 4.9 5.3 6.8 5.0 5.8 6.4 5.0 1995 6.9 17.0 11.3 8.3 11.5
2005 3.4 3.5 4.0 5.2 3.9 3.7 6.6 4.6 5.2 3.8 3.5 1997 5.6 9.9 6.4 6.3 6.4
 
Difference to euro 
area          
Difference to 
Germany 
2001  1.3 5.1 2.6 2.5 3.1 2.9 1.2 5.7 -5.0 3.0 1993  16.8 3.7 1.2 4.7
2003  0.0 1.1 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.7 0.9 1.6 2.2 0.8 1995  10.2 4.4 1.4 4.6
2005  0.1 0.6 1.7 0.5 0.3 3.2 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.1 1997  4.3 0.8 0.7 0.7
             
3 month money 
market            
2001 4.3 5.2 5.3 5.9 6.9 5.9 10.9 4.9 16.1 10.9 7.8 1993 7.2 23.5 11.7 9.3 13.3
2003 2.3 2.3 2.9 3.9 3.8 2.8 8.5 3.3 5.7 6.8 6.2 1995 4.5 16.4 9.4 6.3 9.8
2005 2.2 2.0 2.4 4.3 3.1 2.4 6.7 3.2 5.3 4.0 2.9 1997 3.3 12.8 5.4 6.1 5.7
 
Difference to euro 
area          
Difference to 
Germany 
2001  0.9 1.1 1.7 2.6 1.7 6.6 0.7 11.8 6.6 3.5 1993  16.2 4.5 2.0 6.0
2003  -0.1 0.6 1.6 1.5 0.5 6.2 1.0 3.3 4.4 3.8 1995  11.9 4.9 1.8 5.3
2005  -0.2 0.2 2.1 0.9 0.2 4.5 1.0 3.1 1.8 0.7 1997  9.5 2.1 2.8 2.4
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Latvia 
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Poland 
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Slovak Republic 
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